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Anxiety disorders are common and difﬁcult to treat. Some cognitive models of anxiety propose that
attention bias to threat causes and maintains anxiety. This view led to the development of a computer-
delivered treatment: attention bias modiﬁcation (ABM) which predominantly trains attention avoidance
of threat. However, meta-analyses indicate disappointing effectiveness of ABM-threat-avoidance training
in reducing anxiety. This article considers how ABM may be improved, based on a review of key ideas
from models of anxiety, attention and cognitive control. These are combined into an integrative
framework of cognitive functions which support automatic threat evaluation/detection and goal-directed
thought and action, which reciprocally inﬂuence each other. It considers roles of bottom-up and top-
down processes involved in threat-evaluation, orienting and inhibitory control in different manifesta-
tions of attention bias (initial orienting, attention maintenance, threat avoidance, threat-distractor
interference) and different ABM methods (e.g., ABM-threat-avoidance, ABM-positive-search). The
framework has implications for computer-delivered treatments for anxiety. ABM methods which
encourage active goal-focused attention-search for positive/nonthreat information and ﬂexible cognitive
control across multiple processes (particularly inhibitory control, which supports a positive goal-
engagement mode over processing of minor threat cues) may prove more effective in reducing anxi-
ety than ABM-threat-avoidance training which targets a speciﬁc bias in spatial orienting to threat.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Clinical anxiety is a common debilitating problem which is
difﬁcult to treat. Over a quarter of the population suffers from an
anxiety disorder during their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005). While
medication and cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) are effective for
anxiety disorders (Bandelow et al., 2015; Olatunji, Cisler, & Deacon,
2010), these treatments have limitations, such as drug side-effects
and drug dependence, and modest efﬁcacy as only about half of
anxiety sufferers respond successfully to CBT (Hofmann, Asnaani,
Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). Thus, there is a need to develop
effective treatments for anxiety which can be delivered cheaply and
safely to large numbers of anxious adults and children.
One such potential intervention is attention bias modiﬁcation
(ABM), a computer-delivered treatment for anxiety that emerged
from research in experimental psychopathology (MacLeod &
Mathews, 2012; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, &
Holker, 2002). The goal of ABM is to reduce anxiety by reducing
attention bias (AB) towards threat, which refers to the preferentialr Ltd. This is an open access articltendency to allocate attention to threat-related information rather
than nonthreat information. Despite initial promise, ABM has
limited effectiveness in reducing anxiety (Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers,
2015; Cristea, Mogoase, David, & Cuijpers, 2015; Heeren,
Mogoase, Philippot, & McNally, 2015; Koster & Bernstein, 2015;
Mogoas¸e, David, & Koster, 2014; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). To
improve ABM, it is important to examine the cognitive mechanisms
underlying AB in anxiety (Koster & Bernstein, 2015).
This article has seven main sections. First, it describes common
methods of assessing and modifying AB, and considers the effec-
tiveness of ABM in treating anxiety. Second, it outlines theoretical
views of the relationship between anxiety and AB. Third, it looks at
models of attention and cognitive control relevant to cognitive
models of anxiety and AB. Fourth, it describes an integrative
framework of cognitive mechanisms involved in AB and anxiety,
which builds on ideas from these models, and considers how AB
may be inﬂuenced by these mechanisms and related variables (e.g.
individual-difference and task-related factors). Fifth, it considers
how this framework may guide research into ABM. The sixth sec-
tion brieﬂy mentions other issues relevant to the framework. The
ﬁnal section provides summary and concluding comments (Seee under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Upper panel. Example of threat-incongruent trial on visual-probe task (probe in
opposite location to that just occupied by threat cue). Middle panel. Example of
invalid-threat cue trial on emotional spatial-cueing task (probe in opposite location to
that just occupied by threat cue). Lower panel. Example of visual-search task trial
showing a positive target (happy face) among threat distractors (angry faces). Faces are
from the NIMSTIM set (Tottenham et al., 2009); not to scale.
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The primary focus of this article is on conceptual issues which
relate to the cognitive mechanisms underlying AB and their im-
plications for research into anxiety-related AB and ABM. Thus, it is
beyond its scope to provide a detailed review of empirical ﬁndings
of AB and other cognitive biases in anxiety (for reviews, see
Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin,
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler, Bacon, &
Williams, 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mathews, &MacLeod, 2005;
Van Bockstaele et al., 2014; Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008),
or the neural bases of threat processing and anxiety (for reviews
see Bishop, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Lewis, 2005;Millan, 2003; Okon-
Singer, Hendler, Pessoa, & Shackman, 2015; Pessoa & Adolphs,
2010; Pine, 2007). This article complements recent reviews of AB in
anxiety (e.g., Cisler & Koster, 2010; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014) and
considers further the roles of bottom-up and top-down processes
involved in threat-evaluation, spatial orienting and inhibitory
control in different manifestations of AB (initial orienting to threat,
maintaining attention on threat, threat avoidance, threat-distractor
interference) and in different types of ABM training. Before doing
so, the main methods used to assess and modify AB are brieﬂy
outlined to facilitate evaluation of ABM.
1. AB and ABM: experimental methods and effects of ABM on
anxiety
1.1. Methods used in assessing AB
The visual-probe task is widely-used to assess AB in spatial
orienting to threat cues, such as threat words and pictures
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). A
typical trial presents a central ﬁxation cross, followed by a threat
and nonthreat cue (e.g., angry and neutral face) brieﬂy displayed
together (see Fig. 1, upper panel). One of the cues is replaced by a
probe (e.g., small dot, letter or arrow). The threat cues and probes
appear randomly on either side of the screen with equal proba-
bility. Participants respond as quickly as possible to the probe with
a button-press response (e.g., to indicate its location, or identify
the probe type). An AB for threat is inferred from response times
(RTs) to probes. If an individual has a bias to direct attention to the
spatial location of threat (often called vigilance), this should be
reﬂected by faster RTs to probes that appear in the same location
as threat cues (threat-congruent trials) compared with RTs to
probes that appear in the same location as nonthreat cues (threat-
incongruent trials). Conversely, if an individual has a bias to direct
attention away from threat (avoidance), this should be reﬂected by
slower RTs to probes replacing threat than nonthreat cues. AB
scores are the difference in RTs between threat-incongruent and
threat-congruent trials (threat-incongruent minus threat-
congruent); positive values reﬂect AB towards threat (vigilance),
negative values reﬂect AB away from threat (avoidance), scores
not signiﬁcantly different from zero reﬂect no bias. The task pro-
vides a snapshot of AB which depends on the exposure duration of
the cue-pair; this is commonly 500 ms, but may vary from very
brief masked displays (e.g., 14 ms) to longer durations (e.g.,
2000 ms) to examine the time-course of ABs, discussed later
(Section 4.4.2).
Another common method of assessing AB is the modiﬁed Stroop
task. It typically presents threat and nonthreat words in different
colours and requires individuals to name the colour of each word as
quickly as possible and ignore the word content (Mathews &
MacLeod, 1985; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The task is
also used with images such as angry faces (e.g., Putman, Hermans,
& van Honk, 2004; Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, & Bradley, 2009).
Slower colour-naming of threat than nonthreat stimuli provides anindex of AB to threat. Unlike the visual-probe task, it does not assess
AB in direction of spatial orienting. Several mechanisms may
contribute to the interference effect of task-irrelevant threat on
performance, including automatic preferential allocation of atten-
tion resources to threat rather than task-related information, and
automatic inhibition of ongoing cognitive and behavioural activity
triggered by a bottom-up threat-detection mechanism; and
cognitive effort involved in top-down attentional inhibition of
threat distractors (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; De Ruiter &
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studies with over 2000 participants (mainly using visual-probe and
modiﬁed Stroop tasks) concluded that anxiety is associated with an
AB favouring threat information (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), although a
recent review, which considers subsequent research, suggests that
the relationship between anxiety and AB is less consistent than
indicated by this meta-analysis (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014).
Other less frequently used methods for assessing AB include the
emotional spatial-cueing task (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001)
and visual-search task (€Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). The
emotional spatial-cueing task was designed to assess biases in
shifting and disengagement of attention (Fox et al., 2001). A typical
trial displays a central ﬁxation cross, followed a single cue, which is
either a threat or nonthreat cue (e.g., angry or neutral face; see
Fig. 1, middle panel). The cue is brieﬂy displayed (e.g., 100 or
250ms, Fox et al., 2001) on either the left or right side of the screen.
After it disappears, a probe appears in either the same location
(valid-cue trial) or opposite location (invalid-cue trial). Participants
respond as quickly as possible to the probe. The premise of the task
is that if an individual has a bias to shift attention towards threat
they should show faster RTs to probes on valid-threat cue trials
relative to valid-neutral cue trials. If they have difﬁculty disen-
gaging attention from the spatial location of threat, they should
show slower RTs to probes following invalid-threat cues, relative to
RTs to probes following invalid-neutral cues.
The visual-search task presents stimulus arrays consisting of a
target and distractors from different emotional categories (e.g.,
positive or neutral target among threat distractors; Fig. 1, lower
panel). AB for threat is reﬂected by faster detection of threat targets
among nonthreat distractors than vice versa; or more speciﬁcally
by faster detection of threat (than nonthreat) targets embedded
among nonthreat distractors; and from slower detection of non-
threat targets amongst threat (than nonthreat) distractors (Cisler &
Koster, 2010; €Ohman et al., 2001).
The above tasks provide RT-based measures of ABs. These have
been complemented by studies of eye-movements and neural ac-
tivity (e.g., ERP, fMRI) measured concurrently on AB tasks such as
visual-probe and visual-search (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, &Millar, 2000;
Britton et al., 2011; Holmes, Mogg, de Fockert, Nielsen & Bradley,
2014; Monk et al., 2008). (For reviews of AB assessment methods,
see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014; Weierich et al., 2008).
1.2. Methods used in ABM training
ABM is based on the assumption that the AB towards threat
plays a causal role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety
(MacLeod et al., 2002; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; Van Bockstaele
et al., 2014). According to some cognitive models of anxiety
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997), individuals
who have an enduring bias to automatically direct attention to-
wards threat are prone to develop and experience chronic anxiety;
whereas those with reduced susceptibility to anxiety (low trait
anxiety) have the opposite bias, i.e., to avoid attending to threat.
Thus, treatments which remove AB to threat and encourage threat
avoidance may be effective in reducing anxiety (MacLeod & Clarke,
2015; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). This idea underpins the most
widely-used version of ABM which employs a modiﬁed version of
the visual-probe task to train attention avoidance of threat cues
(ABM-threat-avoidance training). In this task, the probe never re-
places the threat cue and, instead, always replaces the nonthreat
cue to encourage individuals to direct attention away from the
spatial location of threat (MacLeod et al., 2002; see Fig. 1, upper
panel for an example of such a trial). ABM-threat-avoidance
training typically involves hundreds of training trials, following
the assumption that the AB towards threat is automatic and habit-driven. Verbal instructions to direct attention away from threat are
usually not included in ABM-threat-avoidance training (MacLeod&
Clarke, 2015; MacLeod et al., 2002), which seeks to induce auto-
matic threat avoidance primarily by habit change via repeated
behavioural practice, rather than by engaging intentional, effortful
control strategies.
Another less common ABM method uses a modiﬁed version of
the emotional spatial-cueing task (Fox et al., 2001). In this version,
the probe never appears in the location where the threat cue has
just appeared, in order to encourage attention to be directed away
from the spatial location of threat (Bar-Haim, Morag, & Glickman,
2011; see Fig. 1, middle panel). Hence, this task is a variant of
ABM-threat-avoidance training.
A limitation of ABM-threat-avoidance training is that not all
anxious individuals show an AB towards threat before treatment,
which calls into question its applicability, as there is no point in
giving threat-avoidance training to an anxious person who is
already avoidant (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). In one study, almost
a half of anxious children recruited for ABM-threat-avoidance
training were excluded because they showed no pre-existing
bias towards threat (Eldar et al., 2012). However, this problem
does not apply to all types of ABM. Another approach encourages
active attention search for positive cues (ABM-positive-search
training) and is potentially suitable for all anxious individuals (see
Fig. 1, lower panel). It uses a visual-search task which presents
arrays of pictures and, in each array, one picture is positive (e.g.,
smiling face) and the others are negative or threat-related (e.g.,
angry or frowning faces; Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus,
Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007; De Voogd, Wiers, Prins, &
Salemink, 2014; Waters, Pittaway, Mogg, Bradley, & Pine, 2013;
Waters et al., 2015; Waters, et al., 2016). Participants are instruc-
ted to search for the positive image and ignore the others.
1.3. Therapeutic effectiveness of ABM
While preliminary reports on the efﬁcacy of ABM in reducing
anxiety and stress reactivity were promising (e.g., MacLeod et al.,
2002; Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009), other studies re-
ported null effects or replication failures (e.g., Carleton et al., 2015;
Harris & Menzies, 1998; Heeren, Mogoas¸e, McNally, Schmitz, &
Philippot, 2015; Julian, Beard, Schmidt, Powers, & Smits, 2012;
McNally, Enock, Tsai, & Tousian, 2013; Rapee et al., 2013). Recent
meta-analyses and reviews of random controlled trials (RCTs)
report small-to-moderate effect sizes of ABM on anxiety symptoms
(Cristea, Kok et al., 2015; Cristea, Mogoas¸e et al., 2015; Hakamata
et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Heeren, Mogoase, Philippot
et al., 2015; Mogoas¸e et al., 2014; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014).
However, effects of ABM on anxiety may be nonsigniﬁcant when
outliers and publication bias are taken into account (Cristea, Kok
et al., 2015; Cristea, Mogoas¸e et al., 2015; Van Bockstaele et al.,
2014) and when follow-up data are evaluated (Heeren, Mogoase,
Philippot et al., 2015). The efﬁcacy of ABM-threat-avoidance
training seems particularly disappointing when delivered in
home-based, rather than laboratory or clinic settings (Cristea, Kok
et al., 2015; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015). These ﬁndings question the
usefulness of ABM in treating anxiety disorders (Cristea, Kok et al.,
2015; Cristea, Mogoas¸e et al., 2015; Emmelkamp, 2012; Heeren,
Mogoase, Philippot et al., 2015; Koster & Bernstein, 2015; Lau,
2015; Mogoas¸e et al. 2014).
Much of this research used ABM-threat-avoidance training.
For example, the meta-analysis by Mogoas¸e et al. (2014), which
found a small effect of ABM on symptoms, examined 43
controlled trials, with over 2000 participants providing 47 group
comparisons. Of these comparisons, 42 (91%) used visual-probe
or spatial-cueing training tasks, and ﬁve (9%) used ABM-
(a) Schema-driven processing in anxiety disorders (Beck et al., 1985) 
Hyperactive danger schema 
(representations of threat)           
 Cognitive biases for threat in 
attention, appraisal, reasoning 
Automatic negative thoughts 
(maintain anxiety) 
(b) Three-stage schema-based model of information processing in anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997) 
 Automatic  
 threat  
 registration  
   Primal threat mode  
(automatic and strategic  
schema-driven processes: primary 
appraisal; vigilance for threat) 
  Secondary elaboration  
(secondary appraisal opposes primal 
 threat mode and reduces anxiety) 
(c) Direction of attention bias towards versus away from threat depends on trait anxiety (Williams et 
al., 1988, 1997). Task-related effort can sometimes suppress anxiety-related bias to threat 
Affective decision mechanism:  
                             High threat 
(automatic threat  
evaluation, increased  
by state anxiety)   
     Resource  allocation mechanism: 
     High trait anxiety: Attend to threat (sometimes suppressed 
                                                            by task-related effort) 
     Low trait anxiety:  Avoid threat  
(d) Evolutionary function of nonconscious threat evaluation processes (Öhman, 1993, 1994) 
Feature           Significance 
detectors        evaluation 
   Expectancy system 
     Arousal system  
Conscious perception  
of threat 
(e) Anxiety relates to negative beliefs and poor self-regulatory executive function (S-REF; Wells & 
Matthews, 1994). Controlled processes account for attention bias of threat monitoring 
                               Self-beliefs 
 Low-level automatic processing 




  Control 
 of action            Output 
(f) Four-factor theory: Anxiety depends on four sources of information, which are influenced by 
cognitive biases (Eysenck, 1997) 
Environmental stimuli & their appraisal 
Physiological activity                                         
Behaviour action tendencies            
Cognitions (e.g. worries)                   
Schema-driven                





(g) Bias in automatic evaluation of threat cues underlies trait anxiety and initial attention bias to 
threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Initial orienting to threat may be opposed by strategic avoidance   
Valence evaluation system:  
(automatic threat          High threat 
 evaluation, increased  
 in anxiety-prone            Low threat 
 individuals)             
 Goal engagement system: 
 Interrupt current goals (‘danger’ mode); automatic orienting to 
 threat. (Possible strategic avoidance, e.g., to reduce distress) 
 Pursue current goals (default ‘safety’ mode);  
 prioritise positive stimuli; ignore minor negative stimuli 
(h) Attention bias to threat and risk of anxiety disorders relate to high trait negative affectivity and 




                                                                                                                Anxiety 
       Automatic preattentive bias                 Attention bias to threat 
                                        Effortful control (opposes bias and supports coping)         
(i) Anxiety increases automatic threat evaluation. Attention bias for threat reflects competition for 
processing resources and can be opposed by task-related effort (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) 
                                            Distractor (threat) 
Anxiety       Threat evaluation system           Distractor representation 
                        Effortful task demand            Target representation    
                                                       Target                      
Attention to threat   
Attention to target 
Fig. 2. Examples of cognitive views of relationship between attention and anxiety.
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(j) Anxiety delays disengagement of attention from threat (Fox et al., 2001) 
                     Attentional components: 
                     Initial shift of attention  (may be unbiased in anxiety)                       
Anxiety         Delayed disengagement of attention from threat (may facilitate further threat processing) 
(k) Attention control theory: Anxiety impairs goal-directed attention and increases stimulus-driven 
attention (Eysenck et al., 2007) 
Anxiety    Impairs goal-directed attention               Increases distractibility, impairs task switching 
   Increases stimulus-driven attention         Increases attention to threat  
(l) Anxiety may stem from dysfunction at several stages: automatic threat evaluation, initial resource 
allocation, strategic threat evaluation, and/or strategic override (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) 
Automatic       Resource allocation system       Guided threat evaluation          Goal engagement          
preattentive    (If high threat: interrupt;             (assess context, coping etc.)    (If high threat: Interrupt  
threat              orient to threat; alerting)                                                              goals; orient to threat 
evaluation                                                          If low threat: Override               If low threat: pursue
                                                                           automatic threat evaluation      current goals)      
(m) Attention bias for threat in anxiety has three components with different mediating mechanisms 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010) 
             Mediating mechanisms:                                           Attentional components: 
Amygdala 
PFC and  
related structures   
Threat detection mechanism        Facilitated attention to threat   (automatic) 
Attention control                            Difficulty in disengagment 
Emotion regulation goal                Attentional avoidance               (strategic) 
Fig. 2. (Continued)
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symptom-improvement effect sizes of several comparisons
which used ABM-positive-search training were larger than the
average effect size of the whole dataset (Dandeneau et al., 2007;
Study 3a and 3b; Waters et al., 2013). Only one study in the meta-
analysis used ABM-positive-search training with a clinically
anxious sample, and that showed signiﬁcant improvement in
anxiety symptoms (Waters et al., 2013). Two subsequent clinical
studies similarly indicate a promising effect of ABM-positive-
search training (delivered at home) in treating anxiety disor-
ders (Waters, et al., 2015; Waters, et al., 2016). Thus, the disap-
pointing ﬁndings of ABM may apply mainly to ABM-threat-
avoidance training. To consider how ABM may be improved, it
is helpful to examine theoretical views of the cognitive mecha-
nisms which contribute to anxiety, and variables which inﬂuence
AB to threat.
2. Diverse cognitive views of the role of attention in anxiety
This section brieﬂy considers various cognitive views of the
relationship between anxiety and attention processes, outlined in
Fig. 2. These models commonly distinguish between automatic and
strategic processes. Automatic typically refers to rapid, uninten-
tional, uncontrolled processes outside awareness (also described as
bottom-up or stimulus-driven); whereas strategic refers to more
controllable, intentional, and conscious processes (also described as
top-down, or goal-directed; Isen & Diamond, 1989; Schneider &
Shiffrin, 1977). The distinction has been subject to debate, as
some features may overlap and operate along continua (Moors &
De Houwer, 2006; Isen & Diamond, 1989). Nevertheless, reviews
of empirical evidence indicate that anxiety disorders are associated
with automatic processing biases for threat information (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007; Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012) andmost cognitive models of anxiety predict the existence of such
biases.
2.1. Automatic and strategic schema-based processing in anxiety
(Beck & Clark, 1997; Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985)
According to Beck et al.'s (1985) schema model, anxiety is
characterised by hypervalent danger schemas (cognitive repre-
sentations of threat) which act as a ﬁlter on information processing,
resulting in interpretative, attentional and memory biases which
favour threat-related information. These cognitive biases give rise
to negative thoughts and images, which in turn contribute to the
experience of anxiety (Fig. 2a). This schema model has been highly
inﬂuential in underpinning the use of CBT for anxiety. Subse-
quently, Beck and Clark (1997) identiﬁed three key stages of
information-processing in anxiety: (i) automatic threat registration
(orienting mode), which operates outside awareness and serves as
an early warning threat detection system; (ii) primal threat mode
which is a mixture of automatic and strategic schema-driven pro-
cessing, including initial stimulus appraisal, hypervigilance for
threat, and negative automatic thoughts, and (iii) secondary elab-
oration, which includes effortful, elaborative reappraisal of the
stimulus context and the individual's coping resources (Fig. 2b).
Beck and Clark propose that anxiety reﬂects the ineffective use of
effortful processing in counteracting threat-related schema-driven
processing. Moreover, verbally mediated interventions help pro-
mote constructive cognitive modes of processing. However,
Williams et al. (1988) note that schema models did not predict
empirical ﬁndings that anxiety seems more closely related to bias
to threat in early attentional processes than in later elaborative
memory processes (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews&MacLeod,
1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987), which Williams et al.
sought to address in their model.
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trait anxiety (Williams et al., 1988, 1997), and task-related effort can
sometimes suppress anxiety-related AB to threat
Williams et al. (1988, 1997) highlight the relationship between
the direction of AB and trait anxiety (Fig. 2c). They proposed that, at
an early automatic stage of processing, an affective decision mech-
anism assesses the threat value of stimuli, which is increased by
state anxiety. Its output feeds into a resource allocation mechanism
which determines the direction of attentional responses to threat,
depending on an individual's trait anxiety level. Speciﬁcally, high
trait anxious individuals have an enduring tendency to direct
attention towards threat, whereas low trait anxious individuals
have a bias to direct attention away from threat (i.e., attentional
avoidance). The model proposes that these different patterns of
bias operate automatically and become more pronounced as
stimulus threat value, or state anxiety, increases. This model also
suggests that early AB towards threat increases vulnerability to and
maintenance of anxiety disorders. It also predicts that early AB to
threat characterises anxiety, while negative bias in later elaborative
processes relates more to depression (see Section 4.4.3).
In 1997, Williams et al. reviewed evidence for their 1988 model
and discussed AB within a parallel distributed processing frame-
work (e.g., in terms of competing pathways for processing threat-
related and task-relevant information). This explained how high
trait anxious individuals can sometimes override AB to threat by
increasing effort allocated to task-relevant processing; whereas
clinically anxious individuals seemed unable to override their AB.
According to the 1997 model, “clinical conditions represent a
breakdown in this override” of anxiety-related AB to threat,
resulting in further symptoms such as worry (p. 132). Evidence of
this override in nonclinical anxiety included unexpected ﬁndings
from the modiﬁed Stroop task, which showed that AB for fear-
relevant words in nonclinical snake phobia was suppressed by
fear induction by the presence of a snake (Mathews & Sebastian,
1993). AB suppression was associated with faster RTs, consistent
with increased effort expended on task-relevant processing
(referred to as the task-related effort hypothesis; Constans,
McCloskey, Vasterling, Brailey, & Mathews, 2004). However, the
conditions which suppress AB to threat in anxious individuals are
unclear, as stressors have variable effects on AB (see Section 4.4.4).
The model has also been questioned as it predicts that low trait
anxious individuals show increasing avoidance as stimulus threat
value increases. However, low trait anxious individuals are unlikely
to direct attention away from severe or real threats; instead, as
stimulus threat value increases, low trait anxious individuals show
greater attention to threat, rather than greater avoidance (Mogg &
Bradley, 1998; Mogg, Bradley et al., 2000; Mogg, McNamara et al.,
2000; Mogg, Millar, Bradley, 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003).
Furthermore, meta-analytic evidence of attention avoidance of
threat cues in low trait anxiety is weak and inconsistent (Bar-Haim
et al. 2007).
2.3. Evolutionary function of nonconscious threat evaluation
processes (€Ohman, 1993, 1994)
€Ohman's (1993, 1994) model proposes that fear and anxiety
depend on a specialised cognitive mechanismwhich has evolved to
detect danger (Fig. 2d). Two of its components are involved in
stimulus-analysis: feature detectors and signiﬁcance evaluator,
which both operate automatically outside awareness. Feature de-
tectors are sensitive to the perceptual characteristics of biologically
fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders, angry faces). When
activated, they automatically trigger arousal and attention capture.
The signiﬁcance evaluator monitors incoming stimuli for a widerrange of potential threats. It is inﬂuenced not only by bottom-up
inputs from feature detectors, but also by top-down inputs from
an expectancy systemwhich reﬂects past memories and experience.
Thus, AB to phobic images (e.g., spiders) may relate primarily to
activation of feature detectors, while AB to symbolic threat cues
(e.g., threat words) in anxiety disorders may relate to bias from the
expectancy system on the signiﬁcance evaluator. The signiﬁcance
evaluator is also activated by the arousal system, whichmay account
for state anxiety increasing attention to threat. Integration of in-
formation from the signiﬁcance evaluator, expectancy, and arousal
systems feeds into a conscious perception system, resulting in the
conscious perception of threat.
Evidence of automatic threat evaluation includes physiological
responses to pictures of masked fear-related stimuli (e.g., snakes,
spiders; €Ohman & Soares, 1993, 1994), and amygdala response to
unattended or masked threat cues such as fearful or angry faces
(e.g., Dolan & Vuillemier, 2003; LeDoux, 1996; Monk et al., 2008;
see Section 4.3.1). Some speciﬁc details of €Ohman's (1993) model
have been queried based on later empirical ﬁndings; e.g., van den
Hout, de Jong, and Kindt (2000) proposed that the signiﬁcance
evaluator can directly trigger arousal responses outside awareness,
as suggested by physiological responses to masked threat words.
Nonetheless, the model's emphasis on automatic threat-evaluation
processes has been inﬂuential (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998;
Mogg & Bradley, 1998).
2.4. Anxiety stems from negative beliefs and poor self-regulatory
executive function (Wells & Matthews, 1994)
Wells and Matthews’ (1994) model of self-regulatory executive
function (S-REF) emphasises the role of strategic processes in anx-
iety and AB (Fig. 2e). It distinguishes three levels of processing: (i)
low-level automatic processes, (ii) controlled processes including
conscious appraisal and attention control, which support regula-
tion of thought and behaviour; i.e., S-REF, and (iii) beliefs, which
guide controlled process. Trait anxiety is characterised by negative
beliefs and dysfunctional S-REF activity, which includes conscious
negative appraisals and threat monitoring. AB for threat in anxiety
is explained by controlled processes. Thus, the model cannot ac-
count for anxiety-related biases in automatic processing of threat
(for evidence of such biases, see reviews by Bar-Haim et al., 2007;
Teachman et al., 2012).
2.5. Four-factor theory: anxiety depends on four sources of
information inﬂuenced by cognitive biases (Eysenck, 1997)
Eysenck (1992) proposed that hypervigilance underlies AB for
threat and increased general distractibility in both high trait anxi-
ety and generalised anxiety disorder. Hypervigilance is a latent
vulnerability factor for anxiety, so is more apparent under condi-
tions of high stress or state anxiety. This view was developed into
Eysenck's (1997) four-factor theory which proposed that four
sources of information contribute to anxiety: external stimuli,
physiological activity, behaviour action tendencies, and cognitions
such as worries (Fig. 2f). Individual differences in anxiety depend
on attention and interpretation biases, which are guided by sche-
mas (e.g., memory representations of danger) and applied to these
four sources of information. High trait anxious individuals have
attention and interpretation biases favouring threat information,
repressors (low trait anxious individuals with high social desir-
ability scores) have opposite biases, and low trait anxious in-
dividuals (who have low social desirability scores) have no biases.
Furthermore, different anxiety disorders have different predispos-
ing factors that reﬂect the relative importance of the four sources of
information. For example, attention and interpretation biases for
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der, whereas attention and interpretative biases for all four sources
of information contribute to high trait anxiety and generalised
anxiety disorder. Eysenck (2004) discusses limitations of four-
factor theory, such as inconsistent evidence of opposite attention
and interpretative biases in repressors.
2.6. Bias in automatic threat evaluation underlies trait anxiety and
initial AB to threat, which may be followed by strategic avoidance
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998)
Our cognitive-motivational analysis proposed that anxiety
vulnerability stems mainly from a bias in automatic threat evalu-
ation, rather than the direction of AB (as proposed by Williams
et al., 1988, 1997). It posits that stimulus threat value is automati-
cally assessed by a valence evaluation system, inﬂuenced by several
variables (stimulus features, context, prior learning, state and trait
anxiety). This system is more reactive to threat cues in anxiety-
prone individuals. Its output feeds into a goal engagement system
which, in the absence of threat, focuses on processing goal-relevant
stimuli and inhibits processing of minor task-irrelevant negative
cues (Fig. 2g). However, if the valence evaluation system judges a
stimulus to have high threat value, this triggers automatic attention
to the threat and interruption of goal-related activity. As anxiety-
prone individuals tend to evaluate mild threat cues as having
high motivational salience, they are more likely to direct attention
to those cues. Hence, AB to mild threat cues may be an index of
anxiety-proneness. It may also maintain anxiety, as anxiety-prone
individuals are more likely to notice minor threat cues in the
environment, which enhances their perception of the world as
aversive and unsafe, and increases their state anxiety.
The model also incorporates the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis
(Mogg et al., 1987): i.e., the initial AB towards threat may be
opposed by avoidance in controlled attention strategies, whichmay
reﬂect an attempt to reduce subjective discomfort or danger (e.g.,
averting gaze from horriﬁc scene, escape); so avoidance may be
more apparent at higher levels of threat or anxiety. Thus, “the focus
of attention of anxious individuals may be unstable, with a ten-
dency to shift attention repeatedly towards and away from threat”
(p. 820).While avoidant attention strategiesmay reduce immediate
distress, theymay be unhelpful in the long-term by interfering with
habituation and thus maintaining anxiety. It was also noted that
controlled attention processes may not only underlie threat
avoidance in anxiety, but also maintenance of attention on negative
information in depression (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997).
The model proposes that attention is automatically directed to
stimuli that are evaluated as having high subjective threat salience
for the individual, and it differs fromWilliams et al.'s (1997) model
in predicting that both high and low anxious individuals show
greater attention to highly salient threat than mild threat stimuli
(supportive evidence includes Mogg, Bradley et al., 2000; Mogg,
McNamara et al., 2000; Mogg, Millar et al., 2000; Wilson &
MacLeod, 2003). Regarding the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis,
while many studies indicate enhanced initial AB to threat in anxiety
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007), evidence of avoidance is more limited
and variable (e.g., for a review see Cisler & Koster, 2010; variables
inﬂuencing ABs towards and away from threat are discussed later,
Sections 4.4.2e4.4.6).
2.7. Trait negative affectivity and poor effortful control contribute
to AB and risk of anxiety (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Lonigan,
Vasey, Phillips & Hazen, 2004)
Developmental research indicates that risk of emotional disor-
ders is higher in individuals with high trait negative affectivity(including anxious/fearful temperament) and lower in those with
high trait effortful control (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Rothbart,
Derryberry, & Posner, 1994). Effortful control is a stable trait which
depends on attention and inhibitory control processes that support
effortful regulation of emotional andmotivational functions, e.g., by
allowing individuals to allocate attention ﬂexibility, decrease
attention to negative cues, and increase attention to positive in-
formation (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997). Consequently, AB for
threat reﬂects conﬂicting inﬂuences of fearful/anxious tempera-
ment (which enhances cognitive representations of threat) and
trait effortful control, which opposes the allocation of attention to
task-irrelevant threat stimuli (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997).
Lonigan et al. (2004) elaborated on this developmental view and
argued that, under conditions which do not allow effortful atten-
tion control (e.g., brief masked stimuli), individuals with high trait
negative affectivity show an automatic preattentive processing bias
for threat (Fig. 2h). However, if conditions allow attention control to
modify this initial bias, the resulting AB towards threat may be
more variable and likely to depend on individual differences in trait
attention control. Tests of the proposal that trait attention control
moderates the relationship between anxiety and AB for threat have
provided some support (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Lonigan &
Vasey, 2009; Susa, Benga, Pitica, & Miclea, 2014; see also Section
4.4.5).
2.8. AB to threat in anxiety depends on automatic threat evaluation
and is sometimes suppressed by task-related effort (Mathews &
Mackintosh, 1998)
Mathews and Mackintosh's (1998) model shares features with
other models (Fig. 2i): e.g., while anxious individuals may show
greater AB for mild threats than low anxious individuals, both high
and low anxious individuals are likely to direct attention to severe
threats (which, as noted by Mathews and Mackintosh, is consistent
with Mogg & Bradley, 1998, but not Williams et al., 1988, 1997; see
Sections 2.2 and 2.6). Also, anxious individuals can sometimes
suppress AB by task-related effort (consistent with aspects of
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The model suggests
that anxiety increases output of an automatic threat evaluation
system, resulting in greater activation of representations of threat
cues. Consequently, when task-relevant target stimuli and threat
distractors compete for later processing resources, the latter are
more likely to capture attention and interfere with performance in
anxious individuals. However, this effect also depends on voluntary
effort expended on task-relevant processing. Under certain condi-
tions, such as high situational stress or high task demand, anxious
individuals may be able to recruit sufﬁcient voluntary effort (re-
ﬂected by general RT speeding) to increase attention to task-
relevant stimuli and ignore threat (e.g., AB suppression on modi-
ﬁed Stroop task; Mathews & Sebastian, 1993). The model suggests
that failure to suppress AB under stress may explain some symp-
toms of clinical anxiety (for discussion of evidence of mixed effects
of stressors on anxiety-related ABs, see Section 4.4.4).
2.9. Difﬁculty in disengagement of attention from threat in anxiety
(Fox et al. 2001)
Drawing on Posner and Petersen's (1990) spotlight model of
attention, which identiﬁed three distinct components of visual
orienting (shift, engagement, disengagement), Fox et al. (2001)
examined whether AB in anxiety is evident in both initial shifting
of spatial attention to threat and difﬁculty in disengaging attention
from threat. The delayed disengagement hypothesis was tested in
experiments using the emotional spatial-cueing task with brieﬂy
presented threat and neutral cues (e.g. 100e250 ms). High state
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appeared in a different location to threat cues (invalid-threat; Fig. 1,
middle panel), than to probes that appeared in a different location
to nonthreat cues (invalid-nonthreat), suggesting difﬁculty disen-
gaging spatial attention from threat. The valid-cue conditions did
not reveal anxiety-related bias in shifting attention to threat. Fox
et al. (2001) suggested that anxiety is associated mainly with
increased attentional dwelling on threat cues, which may serve to
facilitate identiﬁcation and more detailed evaluation of potential
threats; and this short-term increase in dwell time on threat may
relate to worry and rumination. However, a recent clinical study
found that individuals with generalised anxiety disorder show the
opposite effect (faster RTs on invalid-threat than invalid-nonthreat
trials) suggesting threat avoidance (Yiend et al., 2015; see Van
Bockstaele et al., 2014; for a review of related ﬁndings). The
mechanisms underlying such ﬁndings have been subject to debate,
which will be discussed after considering recent models of atten-
tion and cognitive control (see Sections 3 and 4.4.1).
2.10. Attention control theory: anxiety impairs goal-directed
attention and increases stimulus-driven attention (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007)
According to attention control theory, anxiety not only increases
attention to threat, but also impairs attention control (Fig. 2k). This
theory draws on Corbetta and Shulman’s (2002) distinction be-
tween stimulus-driven and goal-directed attention systems, and
Miyake et al.'s (2000) distinction between core executive functions
of inhibition, shifting (i.e., task-switching or set-shifting), and
updating working memory (see Sections 3.4 and 3.7 for further
details of these models). Eysenck et al. (2007) propose that anxiety
changes the balance between bottom-up and top-down attention
systems. I.e., anxiety strengthens the stimulus-driven attention
system,which reacts automatically to task-irrelevant salient stimuli
and facilitates attention to threat. It also impairs the goal-directed
attentional system, which supports two key attention control
functions: inhibition of task-irrelevant information and responses,
and switching between tasks or sets (see Berggren & Derakshan,
2013; Snyder, Miyake, & Hankin, 2015; for reviews of evidence;
see also Section 3.10). They suggest that poor attention control
contributes to difﬁculty disengaging attention from task-irrelevant
threat, as “effective attentional control would involve rapid disen-
gagement” from distractors (p. 346).
According to this theory, updating (manipulating and moni-
toring the contents of working memory) may be unaffected by
anxiety under low stress conditions, as this executive function re-
lates more to transient storage of information rather than attention
control; although updating may be impaired by anxiety under high
stress conditions which reduce the efﬁciency of executive control
processes. Some recent evidence suggests that anxiety enhances
working memory storage of task-irrelevant threat information;
with anxiety and worry being related to greater difﬁculty in
ﬁltering out task-irrelevant threat cues from working memory
(Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013; Stout, Shackman, Johnson, &
Larson, 2015). Attention control theory emphasises the impairing
effect of anxiety on attention control, and complements other
theories, which focus more on the adaptive role of trait attention
control in protecting against anxiety (e.g., Derryberry & Rothbart,
1997; Lonigan et al., 2004; see Section 2.7).
2.11. Multiple dysfunctions in threat processing may underlie
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007)
Bar-Haim et al. (2007) put forward a model (Fig. 2l) which in-
tegrated their meta-analytic ﬁndings of AB in anxiety withproposals from prior cognitive theories (Mogg & Bradley, 1998;
Wells &Matthews, 1994; Williams et al., 1988, 1997). They suggest
that high trait and clinical anxiety stem from dysfunction in one or
more of four aspects of processing: (i) preattentive threat evaluation
system, which may be biased to automatically overestimate the
threat value of mild threat cues; (ii) initial resource allocation sys-
tem, which may be oversensitive to mild threat cues, and (when
activated by threat) interrupts ongoing activity and triggers alert-
ing, initial orienting to threat and a conscious anxious state; (iii)
guided threat evaluation system, which supports reappraisal based
on more detailed elaborative analysis of stimulus context, prior
learning and coping resources, andwhichmay be biased to produce
conscious over-evaluation of threat, and (iv) override mechanism, a
feedback process triggered when the guided threat evaluation
system reappraises the stimulus as low threat, which opposes the
effects of automatic threat evaluation, and which may be deﬁcient
in anxiety. Bar-Haim et al. suggest that malfunctions in each of
these mechanisms may contribute to differing degrees in different
anxiety disorders; e.g., speciﬁc fear disorders may be characterised
by automatic over-evaluation of the threat value of phobia-related
stimuli, excessive alerting in initial resource allocation, and deﬁ-
cient strategic override; but normal functioning of the conscious
guided threat evaluation system. This model describes cognitive
mechanisms underlying AB towards threat (identiﬁed in the meta-
analysis), rather than those underlying anxiety-related threat
avoidance, which is sometimes found in empirical studies (e.g.,
reviews by Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Cisler & Koster, 2010).
2.12. Three components of AB in anxiety: Facilitated attention,
disengagement difﬁculty, and avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010)
Following their review of cognitive models of anxiety and evi-
dence of ABs, Cisler and Koster (2010) propose that AB in anxiety
has three observable components (Fig. 2m). Facilitated attention
refers to attention being drawn towards threat (“i.e., attention
orienting”, p. 208) and is largely mediated by an automatic
amygdala-based threat detection mechanism. Difﬁculty in disen-
gaging attention from threat may follow facilitated attention to
threat, and refers to “the degree to which a threat stimulus captures
attention and impairs switching attention from the threat to
another stimulus” (p. 208, italics in original). This resembles the
delayed disengagement hypothesis of Fox et al. (2001), although
Cisler and Koster suggest that difﬁculty in disengaging attention
from threat primarily results from poor top-down attention control
mediated by the prefrontal cortex (see also Eysenck et al., 2007).
Attention avoidance refers to attention being directed away from the
spatial location of a threat cue, which may reﬂect an emotion
regulation strategy (similar to the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis,
Mogg & Bradley, 1998); this is also likely to be mediated by pre-
frontal cortical regions. With regard to treatment implications,
Cisler and Koster note that ABM-threat-avoidance training may
encourage strategic avoidance of threat (which may be unhelpful
for anxious individuals), or reduce difﬁculty in disengaging atten-
tion from threat (which may be beneﬁcial). They highlight the need
for research to examine the effects of ABM on different AB
components.
2.13. Overview of diverse views of cognitive mechanisms in anxiety
The preceding section illustrates a diversity of views regarding
the cognitive mechanisms involved in threat processing in anxiety
(Fig. 2). Nevertheless, several common themes emerge, including
proposals that AB to threat (i) is a correlate of anxiety, (ii) may
maintain anxiety, (iii) is supported by an interplay of automatic
(bottom-up) and controlled (goal-directed, top-down) processes,
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overestimates the threat value of stimuli in anxiety, (v) is evident
from biases towards and away from threat cues on spatial attention
tasks (e.g., visual-probe task); (vi) is reﬂected by interference in
task performance from task-irrelevant threat cues (e.g., on the
modiﬁed Stroop task), and (vii) can be modiﬁed by controlled
attention processes.
Cognitive models indicate several ways in which controlled
attention strategies may relate to AB and anxiety. For example, (i)
trait attention control may oppose an automatic AB towards threat
and reduce vulnerability to anxiety (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997;
Lonigan et al., 2004). (ii) Attention control (in particular, inhibition
and task-switching functions) may be impaired by anxiety (Eysenck
et al., 2007). (iii) Under certain conditions, such as high task de-
mands or external stressors, voluntary task-related effort may
sometimes suppress processing of threat distractors in anxious in-
dividuals (Mathews&Mackintosh,1998;Williams et al.,1997,1996).
(iv) Strategic attention processes may underlie attentional avoid-
ance of threat in anxious individuals, e.g., in an attempt to reduce
subjective discomfort elicited by aversive stimuli (Cisler & Koster,
2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). (v) Strategic attention processes may
also contribute to prolonged dwelling on negative information (e.g.,
to facilitate its more extensive elaborative processing), associated
with anxiety, depression or their combination (Armstrong &
Olatunji, 2012; Bradley et al., 1997; Fox et al., 2001).
Cognitive models seek to explain differing manifestations of ABs
on spatial attentional tasks which include (i) initial orienting to
threat, (ii) maintaining attention on threat, and (iii) avoidance of
threat. Another manifestation of AB is (iv) threat-distractor inter-
ference; i.e., the interference effect of threat cues on task perfor-
mance, reﬂecting competition in processing task-relevant
information and task-irrelevant threat which can occur indepen-
dently of spatial orienting (e.g., on modiﬁed Stroop task). These AB
indices may reﬂect differing degrees of inﬂuence of bottom-up and
top-down mechanisms involved in threat evaluation, spatial ori-
enting and inhibitory processing. This analysis extends Cisler and
Koster's (2010) framework which focused on three components of
AB (facilitated attention, disengagement difﬁculty, threat avoid-
ance). Distinguishing between manifestations of ABs in spatial
orienting and threat-distractor interference may help clarify the
mechanisms involved in ABs and ABM, discussed later (Sections
4.4.1 and 5.4, respectively).
Cognitive models suggest that vulnerability to anxiety relates to
dysfunction in several mechanisms, including biases in bottom-up
processes of automatic threat evaluation and automatic initial
orienting to threat, and disturbance in top-down cognitive control
processes, including controlled attention, elaboration, and override
of bottom-up biases (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck& Clark, 1997;
Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Eysenck et al., 2007; Lonigan et al.,
2004; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams
et al., 1988; 1997). Each of these perturbations may contribute to
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). These differing views point to a
potential limitation of ABM-threat-avoidance training which fo-
cuses on modifying an automatic bias in initial orienting to threat
(MacLeod et al., 2002), rather than other attention mechanisms
such as top-down attention control which may support emotion
regulation and resilience to anxiety (e.g., Derryberry & Rothbart,
1997).
While none of the models reviewed earlier provides a complete
account of threat processing in anxiety, they make important
contributions by describing key ideas which may be integrated into
a framework for guiding the development of treatments such as
ABM. Before doing so, it is helpful to brieﬂy consider theories of
attention and cognitive control which have shaped previous
cognitive models of anxiety and the framework proposed here.3. Models of attention and executive control systems
Models of attention and cognitive control have undergone
substantial changes in recent years informed by research ﬁndings
in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. These models often
seem conﬂicting, with some describing twomain attention systems
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995), whereas
others identify three (Posner & Petersen, 1990) or ﬁve systems
(Petersen & Posner, 2012). This raises the question of what are the
core attention processes that contribute to ABs in anxiety. A
detailed review of research into attention and cognitive control is
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we focus on key ideas
which have been inﬂuential in cognitive models of anxiety, and
which guide the choice of components of our framework. Fig. 3a
illustrates distinctions between various attention and cognitive
control functions, and correspondences between theoretical views.
Fig. 3b indicates core functions identiﬁed by these models, which
correspond to those in our framework (described in Section 4 and
Fig. 4), and gives examples of possible effects of threat and anxiety
on these core functions.
3.1. Automatic detection and controlled search (Schneider &
Shiffrin, 1977)
About forty years ago, Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) identiﬁed
two key mechanisms in attention: (i) automatic detection, which
underlies automatic attention responses, involves parallel percep-
tual processing, is independent of cognitive load, and outside the
individual's control, and (ii) controlled search, which is capacity-
limited, inﬂuenced by cognitive load, tends to be serial in nature,
and controlled by the individual. As noted earlier, the automatic-
controlled distinction is incorporated into most cognitive models
of anxiety.
3.2. Spotlight model of attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990)
Another inﬂuential view was Posner and Petersen's (1990)
model which described three main attention systems: (i) Alerting,
which maintains a vigilant alert state and facilitates rapid re-
sponses to external stimuli, (ii) Orienting to sensory events, and (iii)
Detecting signals for conscious focal processing. Attentional selec-
tion of information was likened to a spotlight and orienting
comprised separate three functions: disengage from the current
focus of attention, shift attention to new location, and engage
attention on the new target location. Neurophysiological data
available at that time suggested that disengage, shift and engage
functions were distinct mechanisms supported by different brain
regions (parietal cortex, colliculus and pulvinar, respectively). This
model of orienting has guided research into shift and disengage-
ment components of AB to threat in anxiety (e.g., Bar-Haim et al.,
2011; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Fox et al., 2001; Yiend et al.,
2015). However, it has since been updated by Petersen and
Posner (2012), described later (Section 3.6).
3.3. Biased-competition model of attention (Desimone & Duncan,
1995)
Another milestone is Desimone and Duncan's (1995) biased-
competition model of attention, which challenges the spotlight
model. They proposed that representations of objects compete for
processing resources in multiple points of the visual processing
system, including bottom-up stimulus-driven mechanisms which,
for example, respond to moving, bright or novel stimuli; and
higher-level top-down control mechanismswhich select objects for
visual processing according to their relevance to current behaviour.
(a)  Models of attention and executive control systems relevant to attention biases in anxiety  
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(b)  Bottom-up and top-down cognitive functions involved in threat processing and anxiety 
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Fig. 3. Attention and cognitive control mechanisms. (a) Models of attention and executive control functions relevant to attention biases in anxiety (NA ¼ noradrenaline). (b)
Bottom-up and top-down cognitive functions involved in threat processing and anxiety.
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allel within the visual system before one speciﬁc object is selected;
and selection is biased by both bottom-up and top-down controlprocesses. Attention is viewed as an emergent property of multiple
mechanisms competing for processing resources and control of
behaviour. This biased-competition account is widely included in
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3.4. Stimulus-driven and goal-directed attention (Corbetta &
Shulman, 2002)
Based on their review of cognitive neuroscience evidence,
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) described two main attention sys-
tems: goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention. The goal-directed
system co-ordinates selection of task-relevant stimuli and re-
sponses, maintains task sets, and biases activity in cortical regions
to enhance perceptual processing of task-relevant stimuli (see also
Gilbert & Sigman, 2007). The stimulus-driven system directs
attention to salient or unexpected stimuli, and acts as a circuit-
breaker on goal-directed attention, thereby allowing an unattended
salient stimulus to interrupt ongoing task-relevant activity and
automatically attract attention. The two attention systems are
associated with different brain regions, with a largely right-
lateralised ventral frontoparietal network supporting stimulus-
driven attention; and a dorsal frontoparietal network involved in
goal-directed attention.
3.5. Selective attention in perceptual and cognitive control
processes (Lavie, 2005)
There is a long-standing debate about whether attention-
selection mechanisms operate in both perceptual and cognitive
control processes (i.e., early vs. late selection debate; see Driver,
2001; for a review). One recent inﬂuential view is load theory
(Lavie, 2005, 2010), which proposes that attention selection oper-
ates at each level of processing (which is capacity-limited) and
depends on task demands at each level. That is, if perceptual load
(e.g., complexity of visual stimuli) is low, there is spare capacity for
perceptual processing of goal-irrelevant information which allows
it to enter awareness. But if perceptual load is high, capacity for
perceptual processing of distractors is diminished, which reduces
their interference in task performance. If cognitive-control load is
high (e.g., performing a difﬁcult concurrent working memory task),
this reduces cognitive control resources available for goal-relevant
processing and increases interference by distractors. Load theory
suggests that task-interference by emotional distractors (e.g., task-
irrelevant threat cues) may be increased by high cognitive-control
load, and reduced by high perceptual load (although Lavie, 2005, p.
77, notes that distraction by salient stimuli is sometimes unaffected
by high perceptual load; see also Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, &
Dolan, 2001). Evidence of effects of manipulating task demands
on threat-distractor processing in anxiety is mixed (e.g., Bishop,
2007; Holmes et al., 2014; Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, &
Cohen, 2013; Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Vytal,
Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 2012) and load theory has been criti-
cised, e.g., for imprecise deﬁnition of perceptual load (Benoni &
Tsal, 2013; Giesbrecht, Sy, Bundesen, & Kyllingsbaek, 2014).
Nevertheless, the notion of competition for limited-capacity
perceptual and cognitive-control processes (see also Desimone &
Duncan, 1995) is inﬂuential in emotion processing research. For
example, Pessoa's (2009) dual-competition model, based on a re-
view of neuroscience evidence, proposes that emotion and moti-
vation affect competition for both perceptual and cognitive control
resources; with anxiety modulating processing of threat cues at
each level of processing, mediated by amygdala-cortical in-
teractions (see also reviews by Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier &
Driver, 2007).
3.6. Petersen and Posner's (2012) updated model of attention
Guided by their review of cognitive neuroscience researchﬁndings, Petersen and Posner (2012) updated their 1990 attention
model and identiﬁed ﬁve networks: an alerting network, two ori-
enting networks and two executive control networks. The alerting
system is involved in both transient alerting (reﬂected by faster
response to a target when preceded by a warning cue) and sus-
tained alerting (maintaining a general state of readiness). Alerting
is linked with functioning of the locus coeruleus and noradrenaline
system. The orienting system is no longer subdivided into separate
subsystems for disengagement, shift and engagement, as more
recent neuroscience data do not support that view (Posner & Fan,
2008). Instead, in line with Corbetta and Shulman’s (2002)
model, Petersen and Posner (2012) distinguish between top-down
orienting which relates to a dorsal network and is involved in
strategic control of attention, and stimulus-driven orienting which
relates to a ventral network and to an interrupt response that al-
lows reorienting to unattended salient stimuli.
The executive control system in Petersen and Posner’s (2012)
model extends the conscious detection function of their 1990
model to include other functions such as conﬂict and error detec-
tion and monitoring. Their updated model incorporates the pro-
posal that the executive control system comprises two distinct
brain networks: a frontoparietal control network involved in
transient moment-to-moment attention control, i.e., rapid adaptive
control in response to ongoing task demands; and a cingulo-
opercular neural network which supports more enduring mainte-
nance of task sets (Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen,
2008). However, the precise functions of the cingulo-opercular
network, which includes the anterior insula and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex, are not fully agreed, with suggestions that it plays
key roles in maintaining tonic alertness, memory retrieval, conﬂict
and error monitoring, and switching between networks (Wallis,
Stokes, Cousijn, Woolrich, & Nobre, 2015; Sadaghiani &
D'Esposito, 2014; Menon, 2011; Sylvester et al., 2012).
3.7. Unity-diversity model of executive functions (Miyake &
Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000)
A different view of executive control emerged from latent var-
iable analyses of behavioural data from complex executive function
tests, which indicated three separable functions (Friedman &
Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). (i) Shifting refers to switching
between tasks or mental sets. Miyake et al. (2000, p. 56) point out
that their construct of shifting is not synonymous with shifting of
spatial attention, as different neural mechanisms are involved in
task-switching and spatial orienting. (ii) Updating is a complex
working memory function which involves monitoring and updat-
ing the contents of working memory for task-relevance, including
deleting information which is no longer task-relevant, and adding
new information which is task-relevant. (iii) Inhibition refers to
inhibition of dominant or prepotent responses in Miyake et al.'s
(2000) analysis (e.g., assessed on anti-saccade and Stroop tasks).
Subsequent research by Friedman and Miyake (2004) examined
two other inhibitory functions: distractor suppression (e.g.,
assessed on the ﬂanker task); and resistance to interference from
irrelevant intrusive memories, which is also referred to as cognitive
inhibition (Diamond, 2013; Nigg, 2000). Data from healthy young
adults suggest a general inhibition factor, which comprises dis-
tractor and response inhibition, which is distinct from resistance to
intrusive memories (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). However, such
ﬁndings may not necessarily generalise to other populations
(Miyake et al., 2000), and deﬁcits in distractor inhibition and
response inhibitionmay bemore separable in psychopathology and
in children (Brydges, Anderson, Reid, & Fox, 2013; Diamond, 2013;
Nigg, 2000).
Miyake et al. (2000) noted that correlations between shifting,
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ity. This unity of executive functions may reﬂect a shared require-
ment of complex tasks to maintain goals in working memory and/
or a common inhibitory process. In an update of their model,
Miyake and Friedman (2012) propose that individual differences in
executive functions are largely explained by three factors: a com-
mon executive function factor, and separate shifting-speciﬁc and
updating-speciﬁc factors. According to the revised unity-diversity
model, inhibition is subsumed under the common factor, so it may
be a fundamental aspect of executive functions in general.
3.8. Diamond's (2013) framework of executive functions
Diamond (2013) broadens Miyake et al.'s (2000) model and,
based on a review of empirical evidence, describes three core ex-
ecutive functions. (i) Cognitive ﬂexibility includes set-shifting and
task-switching from Miyake et al. (2000) and is also proposed to
underlie ability to view events from different perspectives (which is
also relevant to reason-based appraisal processes). (ii) Working
memory relates to ‘holding information in mind and working with
it’. It is a broader construct than ‘updating’ and includes main-
taining and manipulating representations of goal-relevant infor-
mation in working memory. It also distinguishes between verbal
and visuospatial working memory functions (Nee et al., 2012). (iii)
Inhibitory control includes inhibition of selective attention
(including distractor inhibition), inhibition of prepotent responses,
and cognitive inhibition (inhibition of thoughts and memories).
Together these core functions support higher-level executive
functions including reasoning, planning and problem solving.
Diamond's (2013) review of executive functions provides a frame-
work for guiding research in training to improve cognitive control.
She advocates that, to enhance effectiveness (and maximise
generalisation of and engagement with training), attention training
should engage multiple executive control functions, and involve
repeated practice of challenging tasks that increase incrementally
in difﬁculty as training progresses.
3.9. Multiple demand system (Duncan, 2010)
The function of themultiple demand system described by Duncan
(2010) overlaps with the construct of ﬂuid intelligence and the
common factor (i.e., unity) of executive functions (Miyake et al.,
2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Diamond, 2013). The multiple
demand system comprises a network of prefrontal and parietal
regions, which is activated by a diverse range of challenging
cognitive tasks. This system coordinates the breakdown of goals for
complex behaviours into subtasks which can then be solved by a
series of mental programs. It thereby plays a key role in supporting
goal-directed thought and action (for meta-analytic neuroimaging
evidence of a common cognitive control network, see Niendam
et al., 2012).
3.10. Individual differences in attention and cognitive control
There is considerable interest in individual differences in
attention and cognitive control mechanisms, and how they link to
environmental and biological factors. For example, individual dif-
ferences in executive attention control are related to variables such
as education experience and dopamine genes; and individual dif-
ferences in alerting have been linked with function of the
noradrenaline neurotransmitter system (Petersen & Posner, 2012;
Posner & Fan, 2008; Posner & Rothbart, 2005).
As noted earlier, individual differences in attention control may
contribute to anxiety vulnerability, as poor attention control has
been linked with increased risk of anxiety disorders (Derryberry &Rothbart, 1997; Lonigan et al., 2004; see Section 2.7). Furthermore,
Sylvester et al. (2012) propose that both high trait anxiety and
anxiety disorders are associated with individual differences in
dysfunction in four brain networks: ventral attention, frontopar-
ietal, cingulo-opercular and default mode network; which results
in increased bottom-up stimulus-driven attention, reduced top-
down attention control, increased error sensitivity, and poor
emotion regulation, respectively. The default mode network is an
interconnected brain system that is active during rest and self-
focused cognitive activity (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schachter,
2008). Sylvester et al. (2012) propose that anxiety-related
dysfunction in each of the four networks should be evident on
tasks using neutral stimuli (i.e., it is not speciﬁc to processing threat
information). Moreover, training which improves network func-
tioning may contribute to treatment for anxiety. For example,
training individuals to ignore non-emotional task-irrelevant stimuli
may enhance frontoparietal network function and attention con-
trol, and thereby help reduce anxiety.
Research into anxiety-related impairment in executive func-
tions is relatively limited (for reviews, see Berggren & Derakshan,
2013; Snyder et al., 2015). Several studies indicate that anxiety is
associated with impaired inhibitory control, including poor inhi-
bition of distractors and prepotent responses on ﬂanker and anti-
saccade tasks (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Eysenck &
Derakshan, 2011; Mogg et al., 2015). Although ﬁndings are mixed,
other research suggests that anxiety impairs cognitive ﬂexibility
(e.g., indexed by task-switching) and working memory functions,
which may be modulated by task demands or presence of threat
(Berggren& Derakshan, 2013; Snyder et al., 2015; Stout et al., 2013;
2015).
Snyder et al.'s (2015) review illustrates how executive function
deﬁcits are associated with a wide range of psychopathology. For
example, a recentmeta-analysis indicates that clinical depression is
associated with impairment across multiple executive functions,
including inhibitory control, shifting, and updating working
memory (Snyder, 2013). Severity of executive deﬁcits may vary
across different disorders; for example, impaired updating of
working memory may relate more closely to depression than
anxiety (Yoon, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2014). Moreover, studies of
self-reported attention control in healthy young adults suggest that
poor cognitive ﬂexibility relates more closely to depression than
anxiety symptoms; whereas poor top-down inhibitory control (e.g.,
high general distractibility) may relate more closely to anxiety than
depression symptoms (Olafsson et al., 2011; Reinholdt-Dunne,
Mogg, & Bradley, 2013). Also, impairment in top-down inhibitory
control (indexed by the interference effect of neutral distractors on
a ﬂanker task) may vary across anxiety disorders, with less
impairment in speciﬁc phobias than other anxiety disorders (Mogg
et al., 2015). Further research using performance-based measures
in clinical and non-clinical samples is required to clarify the extent
to which anxiety and depression symptoms are associated with
impairment not only in a common cognitive control system
(Duncan, 2010; Miyake et al., 2000), but also in speciﬁc functions
such as inhibitory control, cognitive ﬂexibility and working mem-
ory. Thus, it would seem useful, wherever possible, for studies
which examine the relationship between anxiety and threat pro-
cessing to also include assessment of the relationship between
anxiety and efﬁciency of processing neutral information on the
same task.
4. Integrative framework
This section proposes a framework describing cognitive mech-
anisms contributing to anxiety and anxiety-related ABs to threat. It
also considers task-related, individual-difference and situational
Fig. 4. Integrative framework of bottom-up and top-down cognitive functions in anxiety.
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by cognitive models of anxiety. Clarifying the mechanisms and
variables that inﬂuence anxiety-related ABs to threat is relevant to
ABM training which aims to modify AB.
First, we explain the choice of components of the framework
(Section 4.1; Fig. 4), which is guided by evidence-based models of
attention and executive control (Section 3; Fig. 3a, b) and bottom-
up salience-evaluation processes (Section 4.3.1). Second, we note
cognitive correlates of anxiety relating to core functions of the
framework (Section 4.2). Third, we discuss mechanisms contrib-
uting to anxiety: bottom-up stimulus-salience evaluation (Section
4.3.1), bottom-up and top-down attention orienting (Section 4.3.2)
and other top-down cognitive control processes (Section 4.3.3). We
consider how these mechanisms and other variables inﬂuence ABs
in orienting to threat (Section 4.4); whether variation in anxiety-
related ABs relates to their motivational/goal-related roles (Sec-
tion 4.5); and whether individual differences in AB in orienting to
threat predict treatment outcome in anxiety (Section 4.6). Impli-
cations of the framework for ABM training are considered later
(Section 5).
4.1. Core components of framework
The preceding overview indicates that there is no clear
consensus regarding the organisation of attention and executivecontrol functions (Section 3; Fig. 3a). Nevertheless, models of
attention and cognitive control share key ideas about several core
functions (Fig. 3b) which have been integrated into the framework
outlined in Fig. 4. This section explains the thinking behind the
choice of its components.
Bottom-up processes inﬂuence attention to and evaluation of
motivationally salient stimuli. In relation to attention, these include
alerting (Petersen & Posner, 2012), automatic orienting to salient
stimuli, interruption of ongoing task-related activity (Corbetta &
Shulman, 2002; Petersen & Posner, 2012), and selection of infor-
mation in early perceptual processes (Desimone & Duncan, 1995;
Lavie, 2005). Automatic orienting and interrupt functions are
linked in Fig. 4, as they have both been related to an underlying
‘circuit-breaker’ mechanism (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002, p. 201).
However, they can also function independently, as the automatic
interrupt function contributes to anxiety-related threat-distractor
interference in the absence of orienting (e.g., on modiﬁed Stroop
task, Algom et al., 2004). Another bottom-up process, which plays a
crucial role in anxiety, is automatic evaluation of the affective and
motivational signiﬁcance of stimuli (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010;
Pessoa, 2009; Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2005); the
functions of which are discussed later (Section 4.3.1).
The top-down cognitive-control system supports goal-directed
thought and action, and biases bottom-up processes in favour of
information relevant to current tasks and concerns (Corbetta &
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& Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000). While some models frac-
tionate this into frontoparietal and cingulo-opercular networks
supporting moment-to-moment control and stable set-
maintenance, respectively (Dosenbach et al., 2008; Petersen &
Posner, 2012), the precise functions of these brain networks are
subject to debate (Wallis et al., 2015; Sadaghiani & D'Esposito,
2014; Menon, 2011). Hence, the framework draws on models of
cognitive control that are based largely on behavioural (rather than
neuroimaging) data to identify core top-down functions.
Latent variable analyses of behavioural data from executive
function tests indicate key functions of goal-directed inhibitory
control (distractor, response and cognitive inhibition), cognitive
ﬂexibility (set-shifting, task-switching), and working memory
(maintaining and updating representations of goals, external
stimuli and internal thought content) (Diamond, 2013; Friedman &
Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). These functions are inter-
related and contribute to a unitary construct of cognitive control
(Duncan, 2010; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000).
Inhibitory control is a shared feature of top-down processes and
may be subsumed under a common cognitive control factor
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Notwithstanding its commonality
across top-down functions, goal-directed inhibitory control is
included separately in the framework, given its role in resolving
processing conﬂicts between task-relevant and irrelevant infor-
mation, and its distinction from spatial orienting.
A limitation of these latent variable analyses is that ﬁndings
were based on a restricted sample of tests of complex executive
functions, which did not include visuospatial attention tasks.
Nevertheless, top-down orienting is included in the framework as it
relates to two different types of AB in anxiety: maintenance of
attention on threat, and threat avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010),
and is not the same as goal-directed inhibitory control. The
distinction between top-down and bottom-up orienting is guided
by recent models of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Petersen
& Posner, 2012), rather than the earlier spotlight model of attention
which proposed separate orienting mechanisms of shift, engage-
ment and disengagement, each with distinct neural correlates
(Posner & Petersen, 1990), as the latter view is no longer supported
by neuroscience ﬁndings (Posner & Fan, 2008).
Another top-down process is strategic reason-based appraisal,
which corresponds to secondary appraisal (or reappraisal) in Beck
and Clark (1997), and guided threat evaluation in Bar-Haim et al.
(2007). Reasoning is a higher-level executive function, which en-
gages lower-level functions such as goal-directed inhibitory con-
trol, cognitive ﬂexibility and working memory (Diamond, 2013),
and supports re-evaluation of the emotional and motivational
signiﬁcance of threat cues while taking account of wider sources of
information including situational context, learning experiences and
knowledge of coping resources.
4.2. Cognitive correlates of anxiety
Anxiety may be associated with various perturbations in threat
processing which relate to the core functions of the framework in
Fig. 4, such as (i) dysfunction of automatic bottom-up stimulus-
salience evaluation processes, resulting in over-estimation of the
threat value of ambiguous or mildly aversive cues, and a dominant
modulatory inﬂuence on other processes to prioritise threat infor-
mation, (ii) enhanced perceptual processing of task-irrelevant
threat cues, (iii) increased alerting by threat cues, (iv) enhanced
automatic spatial orienting towards threat, (v) increased automatic
interruption of task performance by threat distractors, (vi) biases in
top-down spatial orienting towards and away from threat,
including strategic searching for and holding attention on threat,and threat avoidance, (vii) poor top-down inhibition of processing
task-irrelevant threat, (viii) reduced cognitive ﬂexibility particu-
larly in the presence of threat, (ix) difﬁculty ﬁltering out task-
irrelevant threat information from working memory, and (x)
biased strategic elaborative reappraisal of threat cues.
The framework not only provides a context for examining threat
processing in anxiety, but also for assessing its relationship with
baseline efﬁciency of each function, indexed by performance on
tasks using neutral, non-emotional information. For example, an
anxiety-related deﬁcit in inhibiting processing of threat distractors
may relate to a general deﬁcit in inhibiting task-irrelevant infor-
mation, i.e., general distractibility (Eysenck et al., 2007). The same
may apply to other functions, such as cognitive ﬂexibility, or
bottom-up spatial orienting (Eysenck et al., 2007; Sylvester et al.,
2012).
4.3. Cognitive mechanisms contributing to anxiety
Within this framework, bottom-up and top-down systems exert
mutual inﬂuences on each other to determine whether thoughts
and actions are engaged on adaptive goals, or on processing threat
information which is unrelated to current goals and which may
potentially pose danger for the individual. Chronic and/or excessive
anxiety may stem from imbalance among reciprocal inﬂuences
between bottom-up and top-down systems, resulting in domi-
nance of a threat-focused motivational mode (to detect, evaluate
and respond to potential threat cues) over an adaptive, task-
oriented, positively focused goal-engagement mode. The outcome
of competition between these two modes biases and co-ordinates
bottom-up and top-down processes involved in stimulus-
evaluation, attention, working memory and reasoning.
While anxiety may be correlated with a wide variety of per-
turbations in threat processing (see Fig. 4 for examples), not all are
implicated in its onset and maintenance. Previous models of anx-
iety suggest that anxiety vulnerability and its maintenance, and ABs
to threat, may stem from dysfunction in one or more cognitive
functions, including automatic evaluation of the threat value of
stimuli; automatic and strategic attention orienting to threat; and
other cognitive control processes supported by top-down inhibi-
tory control, which oppose bottom-up processing of threat. These
functions are considered in the following subsections.
4.3.1. Bottom-up stimulus-salience evaluation processes
Bottom-up stimulus-evaluation processes inﬂuence the extent
to which minor threat cues are identiﬁed as having high or low
aversive motivational salience. From a neuroscience perspective,
one dominant view is that subcortical brain regions are responsible
for nonconscious evaluation of stimulus threat value. These include
the amygdala and pulvinar, which are widely regarded as primitive
brain structures in evolutionary terms. This bottom-up mechanism
may allow rapid automatic analysis of and response to threat cues,
independent of conscious processing in cortical regions (LeDoux,
1996).
A more recent view, put forward by Pessoa and Adolphs (2010),
is that the primary role of the amygdala is to coordinate and
modulate functioning of cortical networks during the evaluation of
the biological or motivational signiﬁcance of stimuli. They conclude
from their review of neuroscience research that cortical regions are
involved in both conscious and nonconscious processing of
emotional information; and these multiple parallel sources of in-
formation are automatically integrated in subcortical regions, such
as the amygdala and pulvinar. The amygdala consequently biases
the allocation of processing resources to stimuli by modulating
other brain networks in order to prioritise selection of motiva-
tionally salient information (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).
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threat-related information, but also in processing emotionally
salient information more generally (Sergerie, Chochol, & Armony,
2008). The amygdala is well-placed for this role given its exten-
sive connectivity with subcortical and cortical networks involved in
perceptual processing, attention, cognitive control and emotional
arousal (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Pessoa, 2009).
Moreover, its activity is modulated by cognitive control pro-
cesses, including inhibitory control and reason-based appraisal
(Buhle et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2015; Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos,
2013; Kanske, Heissler, Schonfelder, Bongers, &Wessa, 2010; Kohn
et al., 2014; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Phan
et al., 2005). For example, amygdala response to emotional stim-
uli is reduced by both attention control (focusing on a primary task
rather than emotional distractors) and reappraisal (reinterpreting
the meaning of emotional stimuli), which are supported by a
common neural network in frontoparietal regions shared by
cognitive control processes (Kanske et al., 2010).
This research is complemented by extensive neuroimaging ev-
idence indicating that anxiety disorders are associated with
dysfunction in a network of subcortical and cortical structures (fear
circuit), which includes the amygdala and prefrontal cortex (e.g.,
Monk et al., 2008; see reviews by Taylor & Whalen, 2015; Shin &
Liberzon, 2010). Anxiety disorders are characterised by height-
ened amygdala response to threat cues, and dysfunctional con-
nectivity between the amygdala and prefrontal cortical regions
which support cognitive control and emotion regulation. This fear
circuit is involved in evaluation and detection of threat cues, elic-
iting and regulating emotional responses, and fear learning and
extinction (LeDoux, 2012).
Thus, the present framework encompasses the view that
bottom-up stimulus-salience evaluation processes play an impor-
tant role in contributing to anxiety, and that evaluation of the
motivational importance of a stimulus, which includes its threat
value, can occur outside awareness and depends on automatic
integration of information from multiple sources (Pessoa &
Adolphs, 2010). The key role of this stimulus-salience evaluation
mechanism is not only to identify whether an unattended stimulus
has high motivational salience for the individual, but also to
modulate processing in other bottom-up and top-down systems in
favour of prioritising motivationally important stimuli. This in-
cludes activating bottom-up attention functions of reﬂexive ori-
enting to threat, interruption of goal-directed processing, alerting;
modulating perceptual processing; and biasing top-down pro-
cesses such as controlled spatial orienting, working memory and
reasoning in favour of processing motivationally salient stimuli.
Importantly, despite largely operating automatically, reactivity of
this stimulus-salience-evaluation mechanism to threat cues can be
downregulated by top-down cognitive control (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007; Cohen et al., 2015; Iordan et al., 2013; Ochsner & Gross,
2005).
Anxiety-proneness and anxiety disorders may reﬂect malfunc-
tion in more than one operation of this mechanism, including (i)
exaggerated automatic evaluation of the threat value of stimuli, (ii)
excessive outputs to other bottom-up and top-down processes, and
(iii) inadequate modulation of its activity by inputs from top-down
cognitive-control processes. Consequently, it may exert a domi-
nating modulatory inﬂuence over bottom-up and top-down pro-
cesses, with resultant difﬁculty in sustaining adaptive goal-directed
thought and action in the presence of minor threat cues.
4.3.2. Bottom-up and top-down attention orienting
The role of bottom-up attention orienting processes in anxiety
has been the subject of debate in previous models of anxiety. A key
question of relevance to ABM research is whether or not biasedautomatic orienting to threat plays a causal role in anxiety. One
view is that enhanced automatic initial orienting towards minor
threat cues underlies proneness to anxiety, and that attentional
avoidance of threat is associated with resilience to anxiety, i.e. low
trait anxiety (Williams et al., 1988, 1997). Hence, reducing AB to
threat may reduce anxiety (see also Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).
Another view is that anxious individuals show increased automatic
initial orienting to minor threats because the stimuli have been
evaluated as having disproportionately high threat value, due to a
bias in automatic threat-evaluation processes (Mogg & Bradley,
1998).
The present framework is more consistent with the latter view
and extends it. Both anxiety and ABs in orienting to threat may be
the consequence of imbalance between bottom-up threat-salience-
evaluation and top-down cognitive-control systems. While AB in
initial attention orienting towards threat may not be the primary
cause of anxiety; this and other ABs may contribute to it, as noted
by previous models of anxiety. For example, AB in automatic initial
orienting to threat may increase detection of minor threat cues in
the environment, AB in strategic maintenance of attention on
threat may enhance dwelling on danger, AB in strategic threat
avoidance or unstable AB may impede habituation during threat
exposure (e.g., Fox et al., 2001; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams
et al., 1988). These ABs in orienting towards and away from threat
complement AB in threat-distractor interference, which also re-
ﬂects imbalance between bottom-up and top-down systems, and
may also contribute to anxiety (e.g., difﬁculty in suppressing AB in
threat-distractor interference, due to enhanced bottom-up inter-
rupt and insufﬁcient task-related cognitive control, may increase
intrusive negative thoughts and worries). Thus, in our framework,
anxiety and ABs are manifestations of imbalance between bottom-
up salience-evaluation and top-down cognitive-control systems.
Much evidence of anxiety-related ABs in spatial orienting to
threat has come from visual-probe task and eye-tracking studies
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). These tasks
typically use relatively long stimulus-exposure durations for threat
cues (e.g., 500 ms or more) which allows inﬂuences of both auto-
matic and strategic orienting. Some visual-probe studies, which use
masked and brieﬂy presented (e.g., 14e20 ms) stimuli to restrict
awareness, indicate an anxiety-related bias in automatic initial
orienting towards threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Fox, 2002; Mogg,
Bradley, & Williams, 1995). However, this research does not
clarify whether this bias is a correlate or cause of anxiety.
It has been argued that if ABM-threat-avoidance training is
effective in reducing both AB towards threat and anxiety, this
would conﬁrm a causal role of the AB in anxiety (MacLeod& Clarke,
2015). The weak effect of ABM-threat-avoidance training on
reducing anxiety could be explained by this ABM method being
insufﬁciently effective in modifying the mechanisms responsible
for both AB and anxiety. If so, its poor efﬁcacywould not necessarily
challenge the hypothesis of a causal role of AB in anxiety.
However, if ABM is shown to be effective in reducing both
anxiety and an AB in orienting towards threat, this would not
necessarily conﬁrm that this particular AB causes anxiety, because
ABM may affect other mechanisms which underlie both AB in ori-
enting to threat and anxiety. For example, repeatedly ignoring
minor threat cues may strengthen top-down inhibitory control
processes which oppose the inﬂuence of the bottom-up stimulus-
salience evaluation system, which prioritises threat processing and
biases bottom-up and top-down orienting (Fig. 4). Thus, modiﬁ-
cation of the relationship between top-down cognitive control and
bottom-up threat-salience evaluation may result in reductions in
both anxiety and ABs in orienting responses to threat.
Also, some evidence suggests that ABM-threat-avoidance
training may modify strategic rather than automatic orienting
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even if a strong effect were to be found of ABM-threat-avoidance
training on both AB towards threat and anxiety, this would not
necessarily conﬁrm the hypothesis that a bias in automatic initial
orienting towards threat has a causal role in anxiety. This highlights
the importance of clarifying the speciﬁc processes involved in ABs,
as this has implications for ABM regarding which AB should be
targeted (e.g., automatic orienting, strategic orienting, goal-
directed inhibitory control of threat distractors). Further research
should investigate mechanisms mediating the effects of ABM on
both anxiety and ABs, including the extent to which cognitive
control processes may contribute to each effect (Browning, Holmes,
Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010; Heeren, Mogoas¸e, McNally,
et al., 2015).
4.3.3. Cognitive control processes
A common theme of models of anxiety concerns the role of top-
down cognitive control in supporting goal-directed processes and
opposing processing of task-irrelevant threat (e.g., Bar-Haim et al.,
2007; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Eysenck et al., 2007; Lonigan
et al., 2004; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Rothbart et al., 1994;
Williams et al., 1996; 1997). Top-down cognitive control may play
a protective role in regulating emotion and reducing anxiety-
proneness (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Lonigan et al., 2004;
Rothbart et al., 1994). It has also been described as an override
mechanism that opposes the inﬂuence of the automatic threat-
evaluation system on attention (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Within the present framework, this override mechanism may
reﬂect co-ordinated functioning of multiple top-down cognitive
control processes, involving a common executive function factor
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012) or multiple demand system (Duncan,
2010), which supports adaptive goal-directed processing. Thus,
depending on the speciﬁc task requirements and motivational
priorities of the individual, an override mechanism may engage a
wide range of top-down functions (Fig. 4), including goal-directed
inhibitory control (e.g., suppress bottom-up threat-salience evalu-
ation system and resolve processing conﬂicts to support goal-
directed activity), controlled spatial orienting (e.g., hold attention
on goal-relevant information), attention ﬂexibility (adaptive
switching between tasks to support goals), working memory op-
erations (maintaining representations of goals in working-memory
and updating its contents), and reason-based appraisal processes
(e.g., re-evaluate the importance of task-irrelevant threat cues). Of
these functions, goal-directed inhibitory control may be particu-
larly important in opposing processing of task-irrelevant threat
information (Eysenck et al., 2007), as well as contributing to top-
down cognitive control functions in general (Miyake & Friedman,
2012).
While a key feature of this framework is the widely-used
construct of inhibitory control (Diamond, 2013; Miyake &
Friedman, 2012), its role in various aspects of processing such as
attention and memory requires further clariﬁcation (Aron, Robbins,
& Poldrack, 2014). It is helpful to distinguish between bottom-up
(automatic) and top-down sources of inhibition (Aron et al.,
2014), which together inﬂuence the extent to which task-
irrelevant threat cues inﬂuence task performance. For example,
slower colour-naming of threat than neutral words on the modiﬁed
Stroop task (or slower detection of neutral targets among threat
than neutral distractors on visual-search tasks may reﬂect a com-
bination of automatic inhibition (interruption) of task-related
processes by the threat-salience evaluation system, and insufﬁ-
cient goal-directed inhibitory control to oppose this bottom-up
effect.
Poor goal-directed inhibitory control may not only be an
important mechanism contributing to ABs in anxiety, but it mayalso play a key role in intrusive negative thinking including rumi-
nation and worry (Kircanski, Johnson, Mateen, Bjork, & Gotlib,
2015). Efﬁcient goal-directed inhibitory control also supports
reason-based appraisal, which involves inhibition of negative in-
formation or meanings of stimuli, in favour of positive or nonthreat
meanings (Cohen, Daches, Mor, & Henik, 2014; McRae et al., 2010;
Kankse et al., 2010; Tabibnia et al., 2011). Interventions which
strengthen goal-directed inhibitory control, such as training in-
dividuals to ignore neutral task-irrelevant information on a ﬂanker
task, may be effective in reducing intrusive negative thinking and
mood (Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2014) and in suppressing neural ac-
tivity such as amygdala function associated with bottom-up threat
bias on processing (Cohen et al., 2015).
Given that the cognitive control system operates in a uniﬁed co-
ordinated manner to support goal-directed thought and behaviour
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Duncan, 2010; Miller & Cohen, 2001),
an effective override mechanism may depend more on synchron-
ised functioning of the cognitive control system as a whole, rather
than the function of any isolated component. If so, ABM training
methods which engage a wide range of top-down processes in
order to enhance co-ordinated cognitive control (particularly, goal-
directed inhibitory control) and oppose bottom-up threat pro-
cessing, may be more effective in the treatment of anxiety, than
ABM methods which focus on modifying one speciﬁc cognitive
function such as automatic spatial orienting towards threat.
4.4. Mechanisms and variables inﬂuencing ABs in orienting to
threat
This section considers how ABs assessed on spatial attention
tasks are inﬂuenced by mechanisms identiﬁed in the framework
(Section 4.4.1), and by other task-related, individual-difference and
situational variables; such as the time-course of ABs (which relates
to the exposure duration of threat cues; Section 4.4.2), the symp-
tom proﬁle of anxious individuals (Section 4.4.3), external stressors
(Section 4.4.4), trait attention control (Section 4.4.5), and temporal
instability of ABs (Section 4.4.6). It is important to clarify the
mechanisms and variables which inﬂuence ABs in orienting to
threat, because they not only require explanation by models of
anxiety, but also have implications for ABM training methods (e.g.,
ABM-threat-avoidance-training which uses spatial attention tasks
to reduce AB in orienting towards threat). Other experimental
variables that may inﬂuence ABs are also brieﬂy noted (Section
4.4.7).
4.4.1. Mechanisms underlying ABs on spatial attention tasks
In an extensive review of empirical evidence of ABs in anxiety,
Van Bockstaele et al. (2014) concluded that, when recent studies
were taken into account, the strength of the relationship between
AB and anxiety seems less consistent than suggested by an earlier
meta-analysis (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Hence, one purpose in
advancing the present framework is to help identify variables that
may explain why some anxious individuals show an AB towards
threat, and others show no bias or threat-avoidance. Consequently,
it is helpful to consider differing manifestations of ABs on spatial
attention tasks and themechanismswhichmay contribute to them.
This is relevant to ABM studies, which have used several different
tasks to assess and modify AB (e.g., visual-probe, spatial-cueing,
visual-search tasks); so it is informative to examine whether these
different tasks reﬂect similar underlying processes.
Before doing so, it is useful to clarify the terminology used to
describe different ABs. As noted earlier (Section 2.13), ABs observed
on spatial attention tasks include initial orienting towards threat,
maintaining attention on threat, and avoidance of threat. The AB
index of threat-distractor interference is more commonly inferred
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Stroop task). The present framework uses the term, maintaining
attention, in preference to delayed disengagement. While these
terms are often used interchangeably (e.g., Fox et al., 2001), the
term disengagement has also been deﬁned in different ways. Ac-
cording to Posner and Petersen's (1990) inﬂuential spotlight model
of attention, disengagement refers to one speciﬁc component of
visual orienting, distinct from shifting and engagement, with its
own neural substrate (parietal cortex). Disengagement difﬁculty
has also been deﬁned as an AB component reﬂecting increased
dwelling on threat, which may facilitate its more elaborative pro-
cessing (Fox et al., 2001). It also refers to capture of attention by
threat and difﬁculty redirecting attention to a new stimulus, related
to poor attention control mediated by the prefrontal cortex (Cisler
& Koster, 2010). This seems to imply both sustained engagement of
attention on threat and delayed disengagement. Thus, it seems
preferable to describe it as maintained attention (or holding
attention, or dwelling) on threat, as this avoids implying one un-
derlying mechanism and confusionwith the pre-existing deﬁnition
of disengagement as one of three components of spatial orienting
(Posner & Petersen 1990). Another advantage is that recent models
of attention no longer uphold the distinction between separate
shifting, engagement and disengagement components of orienting
(Posner & Fan, 2008) and distinguish between bottom-up and top-
down inﬂuences on orienting (Corbetta& Shulman, 2002; Petersen
& Posner, 2012).
According to the framework outlined in Fig. 4, ABs to threat are
inﬂuenced by both bottom-up and top-down processes. This view
integrates ideas from early models which focused on the role of
each type of process in ABs (e.g., Williams et al., 1988; Wells &
Matthews, 1994) and later views of the contributions of both pro-
cesses to ABs (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Cisler
& Koster, 2010; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Eysenck et al., 2007;
Lonigan et al., 2004; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997).
Speciﬁc mechanisms, which may inﬂuence RT-based measures
of AB on spatial attention tasks, include bottom-up threat-salience
evaluation (which biases other processes including orienting),
automatic interruption (inhibition) of ongoing activity, alerting,
automatic orienting to threat, strategic orienting towards or away
from threat, goal-directed inhibitory control (which opposes the
biasing effect of the bottom-up salience-evaluation mechanism,
and supports task-related processing and threat-distractor inhibi-
tion), and switching from bottom-up threat processing to top-
down goal-directed processing; see Fig. 4. While automatic ori-
enting and interrupt functions may relate to a common circuit-
breaker mechanism (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), they are also
separable, as threat cues may automatically interrupt performance
on tasks independent of spatial orienting (e.g., modiﬁed Stroop task
using masked and unmasked threat stimuli; Algom et al., 2004).
The interrupt function contributes to a slowing effect of threat on
task performance, while alerting contributes to a speeding effect of
threat on RT. These may inﬂuence AB indices which are based on a
comparison of RTs from trials where threat is present versus absent.
Consequently, some AB measures from attention-orienting
tasks, which are based on comparison of threat-present versus
threat-absent trials, may reﬂect processes other than AB in orient-
ing to threat. For example, on emotional spatial-cueing tasks,
slower RTs on invalid-threat versus invalid-nonthreat cue trials
may reﬂect maintained spatial attention on the location of threat to
facilitate its identiﬁcation (Fox et al., 2001), poor attention control
(Cisler & Koster, 2010; Eysenck et al., 2007), and/or automatic
interruption of task performance triggered by threat which does
not involve spatial orienting (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley,
2008); while faster RTs on invalid-threat versus invalid-nonthreat
cue trials may reﬂect a spatial attention bias away from threatsuggesting avoidance (Yiend et al., 2015) and/or bottom-up alerting
triggered by threat which speeds RT.
Relatedly, some studies using the visual-probe task (including
some ABM studies) use a nonstandard index of AB, which compares
RTs to probes replacing neutral cues on threat-neutral cue trials
(i.e., threat-incongruent trials) versus RTs to probes on trials with
neutral-neutral cues. As these trial conditions differ in presence
versus absence of task-irrelevant threat, slower RTs on threat-
incongruent (relative to neutral-neutral) trials may reﬂect greater
maintenance of spatial attention on threat, poor top-down threat-
distractor inhibition, and/or enhanced bottom-up interrupt by
threat which may slow RT. Hence, this index may not necessarily
indicate maintained spatial attention on threat (or delayed disen-
gagement) (e.g., Carlbring et al., 2012; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere,
& De Houwer, 2004; Mogg et al., 2008).
On the visual-search task, slower RTs to detect nonthreat targets
amongst threat distractors (relative to nonthreat targets amongst
nonthreat distractors) may also reﬂect multiple processes. These
may include initial orienting to threat distractors and maintaining
attention on them (due to bias from the bottom-up threat-salience
evaluation mechanism on automatic and strategic orienting),
automatic interruption/inhibition of task-related processes (acti-
vated by the bottom-up threat-salience evaluation mechanism in
response to threat), and insufﬁcient inhibitory control to oppose
bottom-up bias and support threat-distractor inhibition and task-
related processes. Thus, ABM training which uses the visual-
search task, such as ABM-positive-search training, may inﬂuence
multiple component processes (see Section 5.4).
These examples illustrate difﬁculties in inferring a speciﬁc bias
in spatial orienting of attention, such as maintaining attention on
threat, from AB indices which compare RTs between threat-present
and threat-absent trials (e.g., emotional spatial-cueing, visual-
search tasks). However, on the visual-probe task, the widely-used
conventional index of AB compares RTs to probes in the opposite
versus same location as threat cues, on trials presenting threat-
neutral stimulus-pairs (Fig. 1, upper panel). As a threat cue is dis-
played on both trial types, any general slowing or speeding effects
on RT (due to interrupt or alerting responses triggered by presence
of threat) may be similar across both conditions. Hence, the AB
index is presumed to provide a snapshot of the allocation of spatial
orienting of attention to threat (i.e., whether spatial attention was
focused on the spatial location of the threat or nonthreat stimulus,
at the offset of the stimulus-pair and onset of probe). Thus, the
conventional index of AB assessed at short stimulus durations
(within 500 ms of stimulus onset) is widely held to reﬂect a bias in
initial orienting of spatial attention to threat (MacLeod et al., 1986;
Williams et al., 1988, 1997). The most commonly used stimulus
duration on the visual-probe task is 500 ms (which is often used in
ABM studies to both modify and assess AB). This duration is long
enough to allow awareness of the stimuli and inﬂuences of both
bottom-up and top-down processes on orienting. Hence, the AB
index assessed at 500 ms cannot be assumed to solely reﬂect
automatic bottom-up attention orienting.
The conventional AB index on the visual-probe task does not
distinguish between shift, engage and disengage components of
initial orienting based on Posner and Petersen's (1990) original
model of attention (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Fox et al., 2001). Instead,
by manipulating the exposure duration of the threat-neutral
stimulus pairs, this AB index has been used to examine other as-
pects of ABs such as initial orienting, maintained attention and
threat avoidance, which may reﬂect differing bottom-up and top-
down inﬂuences on orienting (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002;
Petersen & Posner, 2012; for further discussion see Section 4.4.2).
The framework distinguishes between attention orienting and
inhibitory processes (Fig. 4). While the functions of attention
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inhibitory control may contribute to various cognitive control
functions, including strategic orienting), they are not synonymous,
so it is helpful to consider their differing inﬂuences on AB tasks. For
example, their distinction may help explain the lack of correlation
betweenAB indices fromthevisual-probe andmodiﬁedStroop tasks
(Cisler et al., 2009; Dalgleish et al., 2003;Mogg, Bradley et al., 2000),
which engage spatial orienting and inhibitory processes to differing
degrees. Attention orienting and inhibitory processes may reﬂect
differing motivational inﬂuences; e.g., automatic initial orienting to
threat andautomatic inhibitionof task-relatedprocesses to facilitate
detection of danger; holding spatial attention on threat cues to
facilitate more extensive evaluation of them; strategic orienting of
attention away from threat and effortfully inhibiting processing of
threat-distractors to reduce distress and/or support task-related
processing. Distinguishing between orienting and inhibitory pro-
cesses may also help explainwhy some ABMmethods may be more
effective than others; as ABM-threat-avoidance and ABM-positive-
search training may engage spatial orienting and goal-directed
inhibitory control processes to differing degrees, discussed later
(Section 5).
4.4.2. Time-course of ABs in orienting: initial orienting, maintained
attention, threat avoidance
Most prior cognitive models of anxiety predict an automatic bias
in initial orienting of attention towards threat in anxiety (e.g., Bar-
Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Lonigan et al., 2004; Mogg
& Bradley,1998;Williams et al., 1988,1997). However, thesemodels
vary in predictions regarding the subsequent time-course of ABs to
threat. For example, they propose that anxious individuals main-
tain attention on threat (Fox et al., 2001), may sometimes suppress
AB to threat via task-related effort (Williams et al., 1997), may
sometimes show threat avoidance following initial orienting to
threat via distress-reduction strategies (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), or
may show threat avoidance following initial orienting to threat and
brieﬂy holding attention on threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010).
The time-course of ABs has been examined on the visual-probe
task by manipulating the exposure duration of the threat-neutral
stimulus-pairs (e.g., between 14 ms and 2000 ms). The AB index
assessed at shorter stimulus durations may be more sensitive to
bottom-up bias in initial orienting to threat, compared with AB
assessed at longer stimulus durations, which allow greater oppor-
tunity for strategic top-down inﬂuences to sustain or oppose
bottom-up bias. Evidence of enhanced automatic initial attention to
threat in anxiety includes ﬁndings from visual-probe and modiﬁed
Stroop tasks of ABs for threat words presented very brieﬂy (e.g.,
14 ms) and masked to restrict awareness of word content (e.g., Fox,
2002; Mogg et al., 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews,
1993). Recent reviews conclude that, despite some in-
consistencies, overall evidence supports automatic ABs to threat in
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Teachman et al., 2012).
However, in most visual-probe-task studies, awareness of threat
is not restricted, which allows ABs to be inﬂuenced by both auto-
matic and controlled processes. Such studies often show anxiety-
related AB for threat, but not always (see meta-analysis by Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), and more recent reviews remarked on the var-
iable ﬁndings of ABs in anxious adults (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014)
and children (Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 2015). Research ﬁndings
commonly (but not always) indicate an AB towards threat cues in
anxious adults at shorter stimulus durations (500 ms; Bar-Haim
et al., 2007), whereas the fewer ﬁndings at longer durations (e.g.,
1000e2000 ms) appear more variable, and include maintained
attention on threat, no bias, or threat avoidance (e.g., Bar-Haim
et al., 2010; Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Bradley,
Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999; Dalgleish et al., 2003;Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Mogg &
Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997; Mogg,
Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004).
Avoidance or attenuated AB to threat at longer stimulus durations
seem more likely to be associated with high threat or phobia-
related stimuli, or high stress (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Koster
et al., 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Bradley et al., 2004;
Mogg, Philippot et al., 2004; Wald et al., 2011; see also Section
4.4.4 on stressors).
Eye-tracking is also used to assess the time-course of biases in
spatial orienting (e.g., direction and duration of gaze on threat
versus nonthreat cues). Meta-analytic ﬁndings from free-viewing
studies indicate a bias in initial orienting towards threat, but not
in maintenance of gaze on threat in anxiety (Armstrong & Olatunji,
2012). Several studies indicate attenuated AB, or threat avoidance,
following initial threat vigilance (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Garner,
Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999;
In-Albon, Kossowsky, & Schneider, 2010; Pﬂugshaupt et al., 2005;
Rinck & Becker, 2006). However, eye-tracking does not directly
assess covert spatial attention and commonly examines ABs over
relatively long time periods (e.g., several seconds).
Lateralised ERP measures (e.g. early and sustained posterior
contralateral negativity, N2pc, SPCN) may help clarify biases in
initial orienting and holding covert spatial attention on threat over
shorter time periods (500 ms) (e.g., Buodo, Sarlo&Munafo, 2010;
Eimer, 2014; Fox, Derakshan, & Shoker, 2008; Holmes et al., 2014;
Holmes, Bradley, Nielsen, & Mogg, 2009; Kappenman, Farrens,
Luck, & Proudﬁt, 2014). N2pc reﬂects lateralised cortical activity
associated with orienting to stimuli in left versus right visual ﬁelds;
and early and late components of N2pc reﬂect its time-course (early
N2pc ~170e250 ms, late N2pc ~250e320 ms after stimulus onset).
Findings of early N2pc indicate enhanced rapid orienting to angry
faces in individuals preselected for high trait anxiety (Fox et al.,
2008), and to phobia-related pictures in speciﬁc fear disorder
(Buodo et al., 2010). Late N2pc did not show trait anxiety-related
bias for angry faces (Fox et al., 2008); and bias for phobic stimuli
was reversed in late N2pc, suggesting initial orienting to high fear
cues was rapidly followed by avoidance (Buodo et al., 2010). Other
studies indicate rapid initial orienting (early N2pc) to angry faces
and general threat pictures in unselected student samples (Holmes
et al., 2009; Kappenman et al. 2014). Variation in N2pc ﬁndings
across studies may partly relate to methodological variables (e.g.,
participant selection, threat cues) which may inﬂuence the sub-
jective salience of threat stimuli. N2pc ﬁndings suggest that AB to
fear-relevant threat may rapidly ﬂuctuate from initial vigilance to
avoidance in under 500 ms (Buodo et al., 2010). If so, absence of AB
at 500 ms on the visual-probe task would not necessarily indicate
absence of rapid initial orienting to threat (Mogg & Bradley, 2006;
see also Section 4.4.6 on temporal instability of ABs). This is rele-
vant to ABM studies which commonly rely on the RT-based AB
index at 500ms to assess change in AB resulting fromABM training.
Concurrent lateralised ERP and eye-tracking measures during the
visual-probe task may clarify the time-course of ABs for threat.
4.4.3. Inﬂuence of symptom proﬁle on ABs in orienting
Anxious individuals vary in comorbidity of anxiety, depression,
fear and trauma-related symptoms, which may inﬂuence ABs to
threat. One common type of comorbidity is between anxiety and
depression. Some previous models of anxiety propose that early AB
to threat is more likely to be associated with anxiety than depres-
sion (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997, 1988). Evi-
dence from eye-tracking and visual-probe studies suggests that
while anxiety relates to increased initial orienting to threat,
depression relates more to maintaining spatial attention on nega-
tive information (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Caseras, Garner,
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2005; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). Thus, the extent to which
an anxious individual maintains attention on negative information
may depend on severity of comorbid depression symptoms.1 A bias
to hold spatial attention on negative information may be linked
with other cognitive control functions such as ruminative dwelling
on and rehearsal of information in working memory, and engage-
ment of elaborative appraisal processes.
ABs in spatial orienting may also vary with comorbidity be-
tween generalised anxiety and fear-related anxiety disorders
(Mogg & Bradley, 2004). Recent visual-probe-task studies of
anxious children suggest that AB towards threat is associated with
high internalising (anxiety and depression) symptoms in disorder-
free children and in those with distress-related disorders such as
generalised anxiety disorder; whereas AB away from threat
(avoidance) is found in children who have both high internalising
symptoms and fear-related disorders (Salum et al., 2013; see also
Waters, Bradley &Mogg, 2014). This pattern of bias in children was
found on the visual-probe task across two stimulus durations, 500
and 1250 ms (Salum et al., 2013), with similar ﬁndings in another
study at 500 ms (Waters et al., 2014). As noted earlier, anxious and
fearful adults commonly show an initial AB towards threat at short
stimulus durations such as 500 ms (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), which
may suggest that fearful children are more likely to show more
rapid attentional avoidance after the onset of threat cues than
fearful adults.
Threat avoidance is sometimes also found in trauma-related
disorders, e.g., attentional avoidance of angry faces at 500 ms in
maltreated children with PTSD and a history of severe physical
abuse, who may be highly fearful of such stimuli; but not in mal-
treated children without PTSD or previous abuse (Pine et al., 2005).
However, PTSD is not always associated with threat avoidance; e.g.,
children who had PTSD related to witnessing domestic violence
(towards their mothers) showed increased AB towards angry faces
at 500 ms, suggesting increased threat monitoring (Swartz,
Graham-Bermann, Mogg, Bradley, & Monk, 2011). While evidence
of ABs in orienting to threat is mixed in PTSD, AB in threat-
distractor interference is more commonly found in PTSD on
modiﬁed Stroop tasks (for reviews of ABs in PTSD, see McNally,
2006; Hayes, VanElzakker, & Shin, 2012; and for a review of ABs
in anxious children, see Dudeney et al. 2015).
One inﬂuential view based on neuroscience research is that
greater cognitive and behavioural avoidance in anxiety is associ-
ated with increased anticipation of experiencing an aversive in-
ternal body state, which is mediated by the insular cortex
integrating information about current and expected internal body
state (Paulus & Stein, 2006). Thus, motivation to avoid subjective
distress may contribute to attentional avoidance of threat in
anxious individuals. In addition, another type of avoidance moti-
vation, namely, motivation to avoid social disapproval (indexed by
high social desirability scores) may be linked with reduced AB to-
wards threat (Broomﬁeld& Turpin, 2005; Eysenck, 1997; Fox, 1993;
Ioannou, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004; Mogg, Bradley et al., 2000).
Symptom proﬁle is also relevant to ABM research. For example,
anxious individuals with trauma-related symptoms may beneﬁt
from attention training which does not encourage threat avoidance
(Badura-Brack et al., 2015; see Section 4.4.6). Thus, ABM research1 Regarding the speciﬁcity of ABs to anxiety versus depression, it may also be
noted that a widely-used index of trait anxiety, i.e., Spielberger State-Trait In-
ventory, contains both anxiety-related and depression-related items, e.g., ‘I feel
inadequate’; ‘I feel like a failure’ (Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 1998). Thus, ABs
associated with this trait measure may relate more to mixed anxiety/depression
symptoms (i.e., negative affectivity) than anxiety symptoms per se.may usefully examine relationships between comorbidity (anxiety,
fear, depression, trauma symptoms), pre-existing AB to threat, and
changes in symptoms and AB during ABM training.
4.4.4. Inﬂuence of stressors on ABs
While stressors characteristically increase state anxiety and
emotional distress, they have mixed effects on ABs to threat. Pre-
vious models of anxiety suggest that stressors may increase AB in
high but not low trait anxious individuals (Williams et al., 1988),
increase AB in both high and low trait anxious individuals (Mogg &
Bradley, 1998), and sometimes reduce AB to threat via task-related
effort or distress-reduction strategies (Cisler & Koster, 2010;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams
et al., 1997).
Early studies examined effects of laboratory-induced stressors
on the interference effect of stressor-relevant threat words on the
modiﬁed Stroop task. Findings included increased AB for threat in
both high and low trait anxious students (Mogg, Mathews, Bird, &
Macgregor-Morris, 1990), suppressed AB for threat in nonclinical
and clinical spider phobia (Amir et al., 1996; Mathews & Sebastian,
1993), and suppressed AB in PTSD (Constans, McCloskey,
Vasterling, Brailey, & Mathews, 2004). Sometimes AB suppression
was accompanied by RT speeding, consistent with task-related
effort (Amir et al., 1996; Mathews & Sebastian, 1993), but not al-
ways (Constans et al., 2004), suggesting another mechanism was
also involved.
Laboratory-induced stressors also have mixed effects on ABs in
orienting to threat. For example, at 500ms on the visual-probe task,
they increased AB to threat words in both high and low trait
anxious adults (Mogg et al., 1990), or had no effect (Mogg, Bradley,
& Hallowell, 1994), or induced avoidance of emotional faces in
socially anxious individuals (Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999).
In an eye-tracking study, socially anxious individuals under social-
evaluative stress showed faster initial orienting to emotional faces,
but spent less time looking at them (Garner et al., 2006), indicative
of a vigilance-avoidance pattern of AB.
Others examined effects of real-life stressors on AB. For
example, pre-examination-related stress increased AB towards
threat words in high but not low trait anxious students (MacLeod&
Mathews, 1988; Mogg et al., 1994). More intense real-life stressors,
such as battleﬁeld-like stress in soldiers and war-related stress in
civilians, were associated with greater avoidance of threat words
(Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Wald et al., 2011). Threat avoidance was also
related to increased emotion distress and psychopathology, sug-
gesting that it may not convey emotional beneﬁt and may be
maladaptive (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Wald et al., 2011).
In summary, anxious individuals under stress sometimes show
increased AB to threat, and sometimes show AB suppression or
threat avoidance, which may partly depend on the severity of the
stressor. Variation in effects of stressors on ABs may reﬂect
opposing inﬂuences on attention from bottom-up threat-salience
evaluation processes (biasing attention towards threat) and top-
down processes, which may maintain attention on threat, or they
may bias attention away from threat (e.g., by task-related effort or
distress-reduction strategies). It would be helpful to clarify further
the mechanisms underlying AB suppression and threat avoidance
associated with stressors, and how these may differ from AB sup-
pression and threat avoidance induced by ABM-threat-avoidance
training.
4.4.5. Inﬂuence of trait attention control on ABs
Several studies evaluated the proposal that anxious individuals
with high trait attention control are better able to effortfully
regulate attention responses to threat than anxious individuals
with poor attention control (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Lonigan
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and Reed's (2002) ﬁndings of relationships between attention
control, trait anxiety and AB in orienting to threat, which depended
on the exposure duration of the stimuli on a spatial-attention task.
Anxious adults showed enhanced AB to threat cues at 250 ms
(consistent with initial orienting to threat) whichwas unaffected by
trait attention control. However, at 500 ms (presumed to allow
greater inﬂuence of top-down control processes), only those with
both high trait anxiety and poor trait attention control continued to
show AB to threat. Other studies using the visual-probe task
showed that youth who have both high trait negative affect and
poor effortful control have increased AB for threat words at
1250 ms (Lonigan & Vasey, 2009), and children with both high
fearful temperament and poor attention control have increased AB
for angry faces at 500 ms (Susa, Benga, Pitica, &Miclea, 2014). In a
modiﬁed Stroop study, AB to emotional faces, including angry faces,
was greater in students who had both high trait anxiety and poor
attention control (Reinholdt-Dunne et al. 2009).
However, not all results are as expected. For example, while
increased AB to general threat pictures was associated with poor
attention control in students with high post-traumatic stress, this
occurred at 150 rather than 500ms on a visual-probe task (Bardeen
& Orcutt, 2011). Also, effortful control did not inﬂuence AB in
anxiety-disordered youth (Vervoort et al., 2011). Comparison of
results is complicated by methodological differences (e.g. in sam-
ples, tasks, threat stimuli, stimulus durations). Nevertheless,
despite some inconsistencies, several ﬁndings support the proposal
that high trait attention control attenuates AB for threat in anxious
individuals. Thus, interventions which improve attention control
may help anxious individuals regulate both their emotional and
attention responses to threat.
4.4.6. Temporal instability of ABs in attention orienting
Mixed ﬁndings of anxiety-related AB may also arise from tem-
poral instability. As noted earlier (Section 2.6), if an anxious indi-
vidual rapidly switches between vigilant and avoidant responses to
threat, this may result in an unstable pattern of AB (Mogg &
Bradley, 1998), which may manifest as little or no bias when
averaged across a large number of trials. Several studies have
examined within-task variability of AB scores on the visual-probe
task (Badura-Brack et al., 2015; Bernstein & Zvielli, 2014; Zvielli,
Amir, Goldstein & Bernstein, 2015; Zvielli, Bernstein & Koster,
2014). One method assesses trial-by-trial AB variability by
comparing RTs from pairs of threat-congruent and threat-
incongruent trials, which occur close together in time during the
task (Zvielli et al., 2014). This RT difference is comparable with the
standard overall AB index (Section 1.1), so this method generates
multiple AB scores, from which measures of AB variability are
derived. Zvielli et al. (2014) examined relationships between spe-
ciﬁc fear disorder, AB variability, and standard AB measures at 200
and 500 ms. Regression analyses indicated that fear disorder was
independently associated with greater AB variability at 200 ms and
500 ms (which suggested rapid ﬂuctuations between vigilance and
avoidance), and also with increased AB to threat on the standard AB
index at 200ms, but not 500 ms. These ﬁndings were not explained
by RT variability.
Badura-Brack et al. (2015) assessed AB variability from multiple
blocks of trials (rather than trial-by-trial variability). In two ABM
studies of patients with PTSD, control attention training (visual-
probe-training task with probes equally likely to replace threat and
nonthreat cues) reduced PTSD symptoms and AB variability, but did
not affect the standard AB index at 500 ms (which showed no
overall bias to threat across both studies in PTSD patients). ABM-
threat-avoidance training did not reduce PTSD symptoms or AB
measures. Badura-Brack et al. suggested that reduction in ABvariability reﬂected improvement in cognitive control (due to
repeated practice on the control attention training task), which in
turn reduced PTSD symptoms.
Further research may usefully clarify relationships between
anxiety, standard AB, RT variability, and AB variability (e.g., using
the visual-probe task with concurrent eye-tracking). RT variability
is linked with psychopathology and poor attention control (e.g.,
Bastiaansen, van Roon, Buitelaar, & Oldehinkel, 2015; Weissman,
Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006), and both AB variability and
RT variability may contribute to low reliability of RT-based mea-
sures of standard AB. Research into AB variability not only has
implications for AB assessment, but has also led to a novel ABM
training method aimed at reducing AB variability and improving
top-down cognitive control (Zvielli et al., 2015; see Section 5.3).
4.4.7. Inﬂuences of other experimental variables on AB
measurement
Other methodological factors which reduce error variance in RT
measurement are important in assessing ABs, such as controlled
testing environments, millisecond accuracy in stimulus and
response timing, sufﬁcient RT data for estimating measures of
central tendency in each condition when calculating summary AB
scores, and dealing with RT outliers in analyses (Ratcliff, 1993). For
example, response devices that have millisecond accuracy avoid
variability in measurement of RTs found with some computer
keyboards, which may obscure ABs (Mogg & Bradley, 1995). Also,
testing participants individually in darkened laboratories may not
only minimise auditory and visual distraction, but also enhance the
subjective salience of threat cues. Evidence indicates that threat
cues are evaluated as more aversive if viewed in a dark rather than
well-lit room (Grillon et al., 1999; Nakashima, Morimoto, Takano,
Yoshikawa, & Hugenberg, 2014). As ABs are inﬂuenced by the
subjective salience of threat cues, as determined by threat-salience
evaluation processes (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), methodological fac-
tors which affect subjective threat salience may inﬂuence ABs. For
example, ABs may be less reliably apparent for mild threat cues
(e.g., threat words) in anxious individuals tested inwell-lit settings.
This has implications for ABM researchwhere experimental control
over ambient testing conditions may be difﬁcult to achieve (e.g.,
clinic, home settings).
4.5. Motivational and goal-related functions of ABs in orienting
Consideration of the motivational and goal-related functions of
ABs may explain why they are inﬂuenced by diverse variables,
discussed earlier. The framework assumes that ABs are driven by
both top-down and bottom-up processes, which prioritise goal-
relevant stimuli and task-irrelevant threat stimuli, respectively.
Empirical evidence indicates that an individual's motivational and
goal priorities exert both automatic and strategic inﬂuences not
only on attention orienting (e.g., Vogt, de Houwer, Crombez & Van
Damme, 2013) but also on other cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive
ﬂexibility; see Custers & Aarts, 2010; for a review).
A primary role of ABs in attention orienting towards or away
from threat may be to support the current motivational or goal
priorities of the individual, such as to detect and identify potential
threats (automatic orienting to threat, and interrupt goal-directed
attention and motor responses); to promote elaborative evalua-
tive processing of negative stimuli (maintain attention); to mini-
mise subjective discomfort (threat avoidance); and to support
task-focused processing (suppress AB in orienting to task-
irrelevant threat). Selection of priorities may depend on individ-
ual differences (e.g., relative dominance of bottom-up threat-
salience evaluation and top-down cognitive control systems;
distress tolerance; developmental factors; comorbidities between
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situational factors (e.g., threat severity and exposure duration;
task demands; external stressors). Thus, ABs in orienting to threat
cues may reﬂect the motivational/goal priorities currently domi-
nant in a particular situation across both bottom-up and top-
down cognitive systems.
According to the framework, ABs in orienting towards or away
from threat depend on the extent to which orienting processes are
biased by bottom-up mechanisms, which support threat evalua-
tion/detection (biasing both bottom-up and top-down orienting
towards threat), and top-down mechanisms which support goals
that may maintain AB on task-irrelevant threat (e.g., threat moni-
toring goal) or oppose it (e.g., task-focused goal; distress-reduction
goal). Thus, it predicts that variables which modify these goals and
the inﬂuence of the bottom-up threat-salience evaluation mecha-
nism on processing will modify ABs. For example, enhancing goal-
directed task-focused cognitive control should reduce the inﬂuence
of the bottom-up salience-evaluation system on other processes,
and attenuate anxiety-related ABs in orienting to task-irrelevant
threat. Hence, improving cognitive control should reduce AB in
orienting towards threat in anxious individuals who show this bias,
and reduce AB variability in those with unstable AB. The effect of
improving cognitive control on AB in anxious individuals who show
threat avoidance is more difﬁcult to predict and may depend on the
extent to which pre-existing threat avoidance relates to task-
related effort or distress-reduction strategies. Thus, while
improving cognitive control may reduce anxiety and improve
emotion regulation, its effects on ABs in orienting to threat may be
more variable.
This framework may explain not only variability of AB ﬁndings
(e.g., across different anxious samples, tasks and test occasions), but
also evidence of AB towards threat in anxiety averaged across many
studies (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) which may reﬂect pervasive bias
from the bottom-up threat-salience evaluation mechanism on
bottom-up and top-down attention processes in anxious
individuals.
4.6. Do ABs in orienting to threat predict treatment outcome in
anxiety?
Given that not all anxious individuals show an AB in orienting
towards threat, researchers have investigated whether this might
inﬂuence response to treatment. Several visual-probe studies sug-
gest that biased spatial orienting towards threat may predict
treatment outcome, as individuals with anxiety disorders who
showed an AB towardsmild threat cues (e.g., pictures of angry faces
shown for 500 ms) prior to treatment, subsequently responded
better to treatments such as CBT and ABM, than those who showed
no bias or avoidance (Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011; Price, Tone, &
Anderson, 2011; Waters, Mogg, & Bradley, 2012; Waters et al.,
2015). However, some results are mixed as, in one sample of
anxious children, pretreatment AB towards severe threat cues (e.g.,
images of aimed gun, biting dog) predicted poorer initial response
to 10-session CBT, but better response to a further 10 sessions of
more intense CBT (Legerstee et al., 2009, 2010), indicating the need
to take account of the severity of the threat cues in AB assessment,
and the duration and intensity of the treatment.
The mechanisms underlying a predictive relationship between
pretreatment AB and treatment response are uncertain. If, as sug-
gested earlier, threat avoidance is associated with greater antici-
pation of experiencing an aversive internal body state (Paulus &
Stein, 2006), a correlation between pretreatment threat avoid-
ance and poorer treatment outcome may relate to individual dif-
ferences in distress tolerance. As prediction of aversive internal
body states has been linked with insula function in anxiety (Paulus& Stein, 2006), it would seem useful to examine relationships be-
tween neuroimaging and AB predictors of treatment outcome in
anxiety disorders (Shin et al., 2013). The relationship between
pretreatment AB and treatment response warrants further inves-
tigation given its potential clinical relevance; for example, anxious
individuals who show strong threat avoidance may require more
extensive treatment.
5. Implications for ABM
As noted earlier, a major problem for ABM research is that the
overall efﬁcacy of ABM-threat-avoidance training seems weak,
with some studies reporting that it reduces both AB and anxiety,
while others report no effect on either outcome, particularly when
used in home settings (Cristea, Kok et al., 2015; MacLeod & Clarke,
2015), which limits its utility. However, other ABMmethodsmay be
more promising (e.g., ABM-positive-search training; Waters et al.,
2015, 2016). Thus, current challenges for ABM research include
identifying ABM methods which are effective in reducing anxiety
vulnerability and treating anxiety disorders, and clarifying the
cognitive mechanisms which underlie their effects.
To recap, this framework proposes that anxiety stems from
imbalance between bottom-up and top-down systems involved in
threat evaluation, attention and cognitive control (Fig. 4). Core
components include a bottom-up mechanism evaluating the moti-
vational salience of stimuli (which automatically assesses the
motivational importance of threat cues, integrates top-down and
bottom-up sources of information, and modulates and biases
other processes); and top-down goal-directed inhibitory control,
which supports positive and task-focused goal engagement, and
opposes inﬂuence from the bottom-up threat-salience evaluation
system (i.e., it maintains an adaptive goal-oriented processing
mode, and co-ordinated functioning of cognitive control pro-
cesses, in the presence of minor threat cues). If this view is correct,
what kinds of ABM interventions may be effective in correcting
this imbalance?
5.1. ABM-threat-avoidance training
ABM-threat-avoidance training may not be ideal in correcting
imbalance between bottom-up and top-down cognitive systems
involved in threat processing, as involvement of inhibitory control
processes which support adaptive goal-focused activity seems
relatively limited. ABM-threat-avoidance training using the modi-
ﬁed visual-probe task requires participants to repeatedly direct
attention away from a spatial location where a threat cue has just
appeared and direct it towards the location of a neutral target-
probe stimulus (e.g., dot or arrow). It is designed to counter an
automatic bias in spatial orienting towards threat via habit change,
so involvement of effortful top-down control processes may be
relatively low; for example, participants are typically not informed
about its goal of directing attention away from threat. Also, the
target-probe appears when the threat stimulus is no longer present
(Fig. 1, upper panel), so there is no direct processing conﬂict be-
tween task-relevant information (probe) and task-irrelevant threat.
Instead, competition in processing is between threat and neutral
cues which are both task-irrelevant. Hence, goal-directed inhibitory
control processes may be less strongly engaged by the visual-probe
task used in ABM-threat-avoidance training, compared with other
tasks where the task-relevant nonthreat target and task-irrelevant
threat information appear simultaneously, such as the modiﬁed
Stroop task, or the visual-search task inwhich nonthreat targets are
embedded among threat distractors.
Another limitation of ABM-threat-avoidance training, noted
earlier, is that not all anxious individuals show an attention bias in
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appropriateness of ABM-threat-avoidance training for them (e.g.,
Dudeney et al., 2015; Salum et al., 2013; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014;
Waters et al., 2014), but also questions the assumption that this AB
towards threat plays a primary causal role in anxiety. Moreover,
threat avoidance is not a reliable feature of healthy nonanxious
individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), which is an assumption un-
derlying ABM-threat-avoidance training. Another concern is that
while threat avoidance may have a short-term effect in reducing
immediate emotional distress, it may not be an effective long-term
coping strategy (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Cisler & Koster, 2010;
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Van Bockstaele
et al., 2014; Wald et al., 2011).
5.2. ABM-positive-search training
Interventions which actively recruit top-down processes (in
particular, goal-directed inhibitory control) to oppose processing of
task-irrelevant threat may be more promising than ABM-threat-
avoidance training in reducing anxiety. An example of such an
approach is ABM-positive-search training, which encourages a
positively-focused attention search mode, combined with inhibi-
tion of threat distractors that appear simultaneously with goal-
relevant target stimuli (Dandeneau et al., 2007; De Voogd et al.,
2014; Waters et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). Findings from these studies
indicate that ABM-positive-search training reduces self-reported
stress and cortisol measures of stress reactivity in adults
(Dandeneau et al., 2007), social anxiety symptoms in youth (De
Voogd et al., 2014) and clinician-rated symptom severity of anxi-
ety disorders in children (Waters et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). Anxio-
lytic effects of ABM-positive-search training have been found in
clinic/laboratory (De Voogd et al., 2014; Waters et al., 2013), work
(Dandeneau et al., 2007) and home settings (Waters et al., 2015,
2016).
Regarding effects of ABM-positive-search training on AB, most
studies found changes in AB measures for threat and positive
stimuli, although these changes varied across studies. ABM-
positive-search training reduced ABs to threat on modiﬁed Stroop
and visual-probe tasks in individuals with low self-esteem
(Dandeneau et al., 2007), facilitated detection of positive relative
to negative faces on the visual-search task in anxious youth (De
Voogd et al., 2014), and increased AB for positive relative to
neutral faces on the visual-probe task in children with anxiety
disorders (Waters et al., 2013). In two studies assessing AB at
500 ms on the visual-probe task, clinically anxious children did not
show AB towards threat (angry relative to neutral faces) before or
after training, or change in AB to threat during ABM-positive-search
training; although they did show anxiety reduction (Waters et al.,
2013, 2015).
In collaboration with Allison Waters, Melanie Zimmer-
Gembeck, Michelle Craske and Danny Pine, we have been
involved in developing an enhanced version of ABM-positive-
search training for anxious children (Waters et al., 2015, 2016).
This uses pictures of everyday scenes as targets and distractors, to
encourage generalisation across a wide range of stimuli (over 350
pictures are used as targets and distractors). Children are asked to
search for examples from two positive target categories, i.e., ‘good’
images (e.g., happy faces, children playing) or ‘calm’ images (e.g.,
book, armchair), which are embedded in picture-arrays of threat or
negative distractors (e.g., house on ﬁre, person in hospital). Calm
target images are included not only to encourage individuals to
search for a wide and varied range of nonthreat cues, but also
because, in everyday life, not every situation contains a highly
positive stimulus to focus on. ABM-positive-search training in-
cludes explicit instructions (e.g., ‘look for good’, ‘look for calm’,‘never give up’ looking for good and calm) to support maintenance
of these goals. Participants are also encouraged to repeatedly ver-
balise these self-instructions, in accord with the view that verbal
mediation supports learning constructive modes of processing
(Beck & Clark, 1997).
Enhanced ABM-positive-search training incorporates general
recommendations for attention skills training, such as varying the
level of task demand and encouraging cognitive ﬂexibility
(Diamond, 2013). In each session, initial training requires
searching for one target category (e.g., look for good), while later
training requires searching for targets from more than one
category simultaneously (i.e., look for both good and calm im-
ages) to promote ﬂexibility and generalisation. The number of
negative distractors on each trial also varies from eight dis-
tractors (in 3  3 picture arrays) to 15 (in 4  4 arrays). Pre-
liminary evaluation of this enhanced ABM-positive-search
training for anxiety disorders has been encouraging; e.g., two
studies showed signiﬁcant improvements in a range of symptom
measures, and clinician-based diagnostic assessment indicated
that about a third to a half of children were free of their principal
anxiety disorder after training; and treatment gains on symptom
measures were largely maintained at six-month follow-up
(Waters et al., 2015, 2016).
ABM-positive-search training could be made even more chal-
lenging for adults as training progresses, for example, by mixing
blocks of trials with word and pictorial stimuli to promote greater
stimulus generalisation and ﬂexibility. To encourage sustained
positive goal-directed attention under conditions of high cognitive
demand (which may increase susceptibility to distraction, Lavie,
2005), later stages of training could be combined with concurrent
tasks (e.g., remembering task-irrelevant number sequences to in-
crease working memory load) or additional auditory distractors
(e.g., task-irrelevant words or music). Progressively increasing and
varying cognitive demands during training may also counter a
common complaint that computer-delivered ABM methods are
tedious and boring, which can pose a problem for treatment take-
up and compliance, particularly when administered in home set-
tings with little support or supervision (Lau, 2015; Rapee et al.,
2013).
To further encourage adaptive balanced functioning of top-
down and bottom up systems, ABM-positive-search training
could be combined with other tasks into a broader cognitive bias
modiﬁcation (CBM) training package with a unifying goal of
encouraging positively focused goal-directed processing and
inhibitory control over threat processing. For example, CBM-
positive training could intermix blocks of trials with different
training conditions; e.g., engaging reason-based evaluation by
instructing participants to work out positive rather than negative
solutions to puzzles or crosswords (designed to have both); or
includingmethods used formodifying interpretative biases, such as
generating positive rather than negative words when completing
fragments of words or sentences (which involves inhibiting nega-
tive solutions). Using a variety of tasks may make training more
interesting and so improve compliance. If CBM-positive training is
effective in reducing anxiety, then subsequent research could
clarify whether it has essential speciﬁc components, or whether it
is their combination that relates to treatment outcome. This may be
more cost-effective and clinically useful, and less time-consuming,
than evaluating a series of interventions in turn which target spe-
ciﬁc cognitive biases, which in isolation may have weak or no ef-
fects. Given that this approach has been useful in the development
of CBT (another multi-component treatment for anxiety), it may
also assist in developing computer-delivered interventions for
anxiety.
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Several other novel ABMmethods have recently been described.
An animated game version of ABM training was developed for use
on mobile phones by Dennis and O'Toole (2014), in which two
animated cartoon characters (‘sprites’) with either angry or smiling
expressions appear to burrow into a grass ﬁeld, and one leaves a
trace in the grass. The training task encourages participants to track
the path in the grass of the smiling sprite rather than the angry
sprite, and feedback on performance is given on each trial. Pre-
liminary ﬁndings suggest that single-session training modiﬁes
stress reactivity and neural responses to threat (indexed by ERP),
but not AB in orienting to threat (indexed by RT), in nonclinical
samples (Dennis & O'Toole, 2014; Dennis-Tiwary, Egan, Babkirk &
Denefrio, 2016).
Another novel ABM task is the person-identity-matching (PIM)
task developed by Notebaert, Clarke, Grafton, and MacLeod
(2015). This presents pictures of angry or happy faces and re-
quires participants to make matching judgements between pairs
of faces, based either on the identity (same vs. different person) of
the happy faces or the angry faces. The attend-happy training
condition involves neutral discrimination judgements for happy
faces and ignoring angry faces. Notebaert et al.’s preliminary re-
sults suggest that single-session PIM training is more effective
than conventional ABM-threat-avoidance training in modifying
self-reported stress reactivity and AB to threat in a nonclinical
sample.
Attention Feedback Awareness and Control Training (A-FACT)
was developed to increase self-regulatory control of attention re-
sponses to threat (Bernstein & Zvielli, 2014; Zvielli et al., 2015). A-
FACT is based on proposals that attentional responses to threat in
anxiety may be unstable and rapidly ﬂuctuate between vigilance
and avoidance (see Section 4.4.6 on temporal instability of ABs),
and that promoting awareness and top-down cognitive control of
ABs may reduce anxiety. In Zvielli et al.'s (2015) version of A-FACT,
participants ﬁrst completed an initial assessment visual-probe task
and were then told that their attention was affected by threat
stimuli, and that they should try to use feedback, provided during a
subsequent ABM visual-probe task, to reduce their AB. Trial-by-trial
feedback on ABs reﬂected the extent to which RTs to probes
replacing threat-neutral picture pairs differed from baseline RTs on
trials with neutral-neutral picture pairs (see Zvielli et al., 2015; for
details). Their preliminary results suggest that single-session A-
FACT reduces ABs (towards and away from threat), AB variability,
and stress reactivity in high trait anxious individuals.
To our knowledge, none of these novel methods has yet been
evaluated with individuals with anxiety disorders (unlike ABM-
threat-avoidance and ABM-positive-search training). Cristea, Kok,
et al. (2015) caution against a proliferation of new variations of
ABM, as there is a need for large scale RCTs with clinical samples
using an approach shown to be promising in treating anxiety dis-
orders. Enhanced ABM-positive-search training appears to be a
promising candidate for such research.
5.4. Do different mechanisms underlie effects of ABM-threat-
avoidance and ABM-positive-search training?
A potential concern with a multi-function approach to ABM or
CBM methods, which engage a range of top-down functions to
oppose bottom-up prioritisation of threat processing, is that such
methods are not process-pure which makes it difﬁcult to clarify
which speciﬁcmechanismsmay be responsible for its effectiveness.
However, anxiety may not be caused by dysfunction in an isolated
process, which may explain why methods which target more than
one process may bemore effective. To examine the effect of ABM oncognitive processes in anxiety, a variety of threat-related and
baseline cognitive functions (involved in bottom-up and top-down
stimulus-evaluation, attention and cognitive control) could be
assessed before and after treatment. Consequently, treatment-
related changes in each of these functions can be related to clin-
ical outcome variables. This may clarify the extent to which change
in anxiety symptoms relates to change in particular functions. Such
assessments may include RT-based measures of ABs in spatial ori-
enting (e.g., visual-probe task), and inhibition of distractors (e.g.,
modiﬁed ﬂanker and Stroop tasks). Eye-tracking can also be used to
assess ABs in spatial orienting (e.g., latency and direction of initial
gaze shift, gaze dwell time; Armstrong& Olatunji, 2012). Moreover,
neural ERP-based measures can be used to investigate initial spatial
orienting of attention and maintaining attention on threat cues
(Buodo et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2008; Holmes et al., 2014; see Eimer,
2014 for a review of these methods), and fMRI and MEG to examine
activity of brain networks involved in stimulus evaluation, atten-
tion, and cognitive control (e.g., Buhle et al., 2014; Etkin & Wager,
2007; Maratos et al., 2009; Monk et al., 2008; Pessoa & Adolphs,
2010).
Such research may reveal that ABMmethods inﬂuence multiple
processes. For example, while ABM-threat-avoidance training may
primarily promote threat-avoidant orienting (as it is designed to
do), it may also engage goal-directed inhibitory control (Chen,
Clarke, Watson, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2015). Correspondingly,
while ABM-positive-search training may primarily promote goal-
directed inhibitory control, it may also engage threat-avoidant
orienting, given that the task involves orienting towards goal-
relevant positive cues and away from task-irrelevant threat. How-
ever, ABM-positive-search training, in particular, the enhanced
version of Waters et al. (2015, 2016), differs from ABM-threat-
avoidance training by explicitly encouraging adaptive attention-
search goals (e.g., look for good and calm, which have generalised
utility beyond the training task), and greater coordinated use of
multiple cognitive control functions which prioritise goal-directed
processing and oppose threat-distractor processing. Within the pro-
posed framework (Fig. 4), these cognitive control functions include:
(i) goal-directed inhibitory control, which supports threat-distractor
inhibition, and is actively engaged by presenting good/calm targets
and threat distractors simultaneously, and explicitly prioritising the
former as goal-relevant, (ii) controlled (top-down) orienting towards
goal-relevant positive and nonthreat information, and away from
goal-irrelevant threat cues, which is directed by explicit instructions
to look for good and calm targets, (iii)maintaining representations of
adaptive attention-search goals in working memory, which is sup-
ported by repeated self-verbalisations of those goals (e.g., “look for
good”, “look for calm”), (iv) attention ﬂexibility, which is encouraged
by switching between good and calm target categories, and also
pursuing both goals simultaneously, during training sessions and
(v) reason-based appraisal, which is engaged by repeated task-
related appraisals of threat cues as goal-irrelevant (hence, low
importance) during attention search. Together, these top-down
cognitive control functions may downregulate bottom-up pro-
cesses involved in threat-salience evaluation. Thus, an important
difference between the ABM-positive-search training and ABM-
threat-avoidance training methods may be the relative extent to
which they engage goal-directed cognitive control processes to
oppose threat processing.
Thus, predictions can be made from the framework regarding
which ABMmethods may bemore effective than others in reducing
anxiety (e.g., ABM-threat-avoidance training versus ABM-positive-
search training). It also predicts that training avoidant orienting
may not be an essential ingredient of effective ABM. For example,
methods which are designed to promote goal-directed inhibitory
control over threat distractor processing, without avoidant
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in orienting to threat. This might be examined, for example, using a
Stroop-type training task (which does not engage spatial orienting),
which presents composite stimuli which have both nonthreat and
threat attributes (e.g., threat words presented in different colours),
and training participants to focus on goal-relevant nonthreat at-
tributes (colour) and ignore goal-irrelevant threat attributes.
However, the choice of goal-relevant stimuli may be another
important parameter of ABM tasks. In the enhanced version of
ABM-positive-search training (Waters et al., 2015, 2016), the goal-
relevant stimuli comprise a wide range of positive and calming
images commonly encountered in everyday life. This is intended
to encourage generalisation across a wide range of situations and
make training more demanding (relative to using a more
restricted range of target stimuli, e.g., happy faces, neutral probes,
colours). It may also enhance positive mood, which may
contribute to ABM efﬁcacy. The use of positive targets may make
training more enjoyable and engaging, which may help treatment
compliance (Rapee et al., 2013). However, the anxiolytic effect of
ABM-positive-search training may not necessarily depend on
using highly positive targets, given that it also includes calm tar-
gets which have relatively mild positive valence (e.g., book,
armchair). Further research could separately manipulate type of
ABM training method and type of goal-relevant stimuli to identify
effective ingredients.
As the framework predicts that improving goal-directed inhib-
itory control over threat processing will reduce anxiety, this raises
the question of whether ABM-threat-avoidance training may be
improved by instructions explicitly promoting the goal of being
threat avoidant in both training and daily activities. However,
concerns have been raised that this avoidant attentional strategy
may not have long-term beneﬁt, discussed earlier. Also, it may be
easier and more adaptive to strengthen positive/nonthreat goal
priorities (i.e., to attend to positive, calming and task-relevant in-
formation) than to strengthen goal priorities which specify what to
avoid.
5.5. Role of exposure
In reﬁning ABM, it would also be useful to examine the
contributory role of exposure. Exposure is a well-established
treatment approach for reducing the subjective threat value of
feared stimuli. Fear extinction, which results from threat exposure,
is thought to depend on increasing the inhibitory effect of frontal
brain regions, which support top-down cognitive control, on
subcortical (amygdala) regions involved in fear learning and threat-
salience evaluation (e.g., Bishop, 2007; Sotres-Bayon, Cain, &
LeDoux, 2006). Thus, the mechanisms which may underlie anxio-
lytic effects of exposure seem similar to those described in the
proposed framework. Hence, the combination of engaging adaptive
goal-directed cognitive control functions during exposure to mul-
tiple diverse threat cues (as in ABM-positive-search training) may
be more effective in reducing anxiety than equivalent exposure
alone.
In some ABM studies, ABM-threat-avoidance training and con-
trol conditions, which involved a similar level of exposure to threat
cues, both reduced anxiety, which could be explained by exposure
or possibly by placebo effects (e.g., Boettcher et al., 2013; Carleton
et al., 2015; Heeren, Mogoas¸e, McNally, et al., 2015; McNally et al.,
2013; Rapee et al., 2013). One study unexpectedly found that
training attention towards threat reduced social anxiety more than
a control training condition; which may have been due to the
attend-threat training condition enhancing exposure to threat cues
(Boettcher et al., 2013). The contribution of exposure to ABM-
positive-search training can be examined by comparing it withcontrol conditions which manipulate exposure to threat cues
independently of goal-directed attention search for positive versus
threat information (e.g., control conditions which involve exposure
to threat cues but without engaging positive attention search and
threat-distractor inhibition; or involve positive attention search in
the presence of nonthreat rather than threat distractors).
5.6. Should ABM-positive-search training be construed as ABM-
threat-avoidance training?
Some researchers have referred to ABM-positive-search training
as an example of “avoid-threat ABM training” (e.g., MacLeod &
Clarke, 2015, p. 66). However, it seems appropriate to distinguish
between ABM-positive-search and ABM-threat-avoidance training
for several reasons. First, they appear to differ in clinical efﬁcacy in
reducing anxiety symptoms. Although not yet directly compared
with each other, preliminary ﬁndings suggest that superior efﬁcacy
of ABM-positive-search may be particularly apparent when ABM
training is delivered in home settings (Waters et al., 2015, 2016).
Second, the methods have differing underlying assumptions. ABM-
threat-avoidance training assumes that the anxiolytic effect of ABM
training depends on reducing AB to threat, as indexed by AB in
orienting towards threat; whereas ABM-positive-search training
does not rely on this assumption. Third, these ABM methods may
differ in effects on goal-directed top-down cognitive control func-
tions (see Section 5.4). Fourth, the term, ABM-threat-avoidance-
training does not accurately reﬂect the operationalisation of
ABM-positive-search-training, which instructs participants to pri-
oritise attention-search goals for positive (e.g., good/calm) infor-
mation, rather than threat avoidance. Fifth, these methods may
differ in suitability for anxious individuals; as ABM-threat-
avoidance training may be inappropriate for anxious individuals
who do not show pre-existing AB in orienting towards threat (Eldar
et al., 2012; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014), whereas ABM-positive-
search training seems potentially suitable for all anxious in-
dividuals, irrespective of whether they show AB in orienting to-
wards or away from threat, or unstable AB. Sixth, there seems to be
no advantage in construing ABM-positive-search training as ABM-
threat-avoidance training, and it may have disadvantages (e.g., it
may imply the methods have similar efﬁcacy or underlying
assumptions).
5.7. Does the anxiolytic effect of ABM training depend on its
effectiveness in reducing AB to threat?
ABM-threat-avoidance training is based on the premise that
anxious individuals have an enhanced AB towards threat, and in-
terventions which reduce this AB should reduce anxiety. For
example, MacLeod and Clarke (2015, p. 59) propose that AB for
threat is “a hallmark cognitive characteristic” of anxious individuals
and that the effectiveness of ABM training in reducing anxiety
depends on its effectiveness in reducing attention to threat. Hence,
failures of ABM training to reduce anxiety may be explained by its
failure to reduce AB to threat.
This proposal raises several considerations. First, many ABM
studies ﬁnd no evidence of AB in orienting to threat in anxious
individuals before ABM training (e.g., Boettcher et al., 2013; Britton
et al., 2013; Carleton et al., 2015; Eldar et al., 2012; Heeren,
Mogoas¸e, McNally, et al., 2015; McNally et al., 2013; Waters et al.,
2015). This concurs with recent reviews indicating that AB in ori-
enting towards threat is not consistently found in anxiety (Dudeney
et al., 2015; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014; see also Heeren, Mogoas¸e,
Phillippot, &McNally, 2015). As noted earlier (Section 4.4), absence
of AB in orienting to threat in anxious individuals may relate to
several variables, such as high fear, trauma or stress, effortful
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ABM-threat-avoidance training that anxious individuals are
strongly characterised by AB in orienting to threat (indexed by the
visual-probe task), and its reduction is necessary for anxiety
reduction.
Second, some ﬁndings indicate that attention-training methods,
including ABM-threat-avoidance and ABM-positive-search
training, can reduce anxiety without reducing AB in orienting to
threat. For example, two studies of ABM-positive-search training
found reduction in anxiety symptoms, without change in this AB
index on the visual-probe task (Waters et al., 2013, 2015). Other
studies compared three different visual-probe-training tasks: ABM-
threat-avoidance, designed to reduce AB to threat (probes more
likely to replace nonthreat than threat cues); inverse-ABM,
designed to increase AB to threat (probes more likely to replace
threat than nonthreat cues); and control attention training which
was not expected to modify AB (probes equally likely to replace
threat and nonthreat cues) (Boettcher et al., 2013; Heeren,
Mogoas¸e, McNally et al., 2015; McNally et al., 2013). These
showed reduction in anxiety symptoms from pre-to post-training,
irrespective of the type of training task, and without reducing AB to
threat on spatial-attention tasks. Two of these studies also assessed
attention control (indexed by the interference effect of neutral
distractors on the Attention Network Task; Fan, McCandliss,
Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002), which indicated that anxiety
reduction was accompanied by improved attention control
(Heeren, Mogoas¸e, McNally et al., 2015; McNally et al., 2013). Thus,
attention training methods (including ABM-threat-avoidance
training) may have an anxiolytic effect, mediated by improved
cognitive control, which does not depend on reducing AB in ori-
enting to threat. Also, training direction of AB away from threatmay
convey little or no additional beneﬁt (see also Badura-Brack et al.
2015). This requires further evaluation, e.g., including control con-
ditions which do not involve extended attention training.
Third, interpretation of ﬁndings of AB change is complicated by
a methodological limitation of many ABM studies, which is the use
of the same or similar paradigm to modify and assess AB (e.g., as
noted by Amir et al., 2009; Cristea, Kok, et al., 2015). Thus, it is
unclear whether AB change, if found, has generalised beyond the
speciﬁc task demands. Participants may show greater threat
avoidance on probe-based assessment tasks after ABM-threat-
avoidance training (relative to pre-training), because they learned
the rule during training that probes rarely appear in the position just
occupied by a threat cue. Hence, change in the AB index from pre-to
post-training may reﬂect (implicit or explicit) learning of this rule,
rather than general change in AB to threat. This problem is not
resolved by the use of different stimuli, or differing probe-based
tasks that share the same rule in ABM training and AB assess-
ment (e.g., visual-probe and spatial-cueing tasks; see Fig. 1 upper
and middle panels). Thus, additional AB assessment measures
which use tasks and stimuli different to those used in training
would be helpful (e.g., visual-probe or modiﬁed Stroop tasks to
assess effects of ABM-positive-search training on AB, as in
Dandeneau et al., 2007; Waters et al., 2013, 2015).
Fourth, effects of ABM training on self-reported anxiety may
be inﬂuenced by response bias. For example, training an indi-
vidual to repeatedly direct attention to the less negative alter-
native of two items could subsequently bias responses on self-
report measures of anxiety towards less negative response
choices, resulting in lower anxiety scores. Thus, use of indepen-
dent clinician-based assessments and physiological measures of
anxiety seems helpful.
Fifth, AB to threat is multi-faceted. AB indices of orienting to
threat and threat-distractor interference are often uncorrelated
(Cisler et al., 2009); so absence of AB in orienting towards threatmay not necessarily indicate absence of AB in threat-distractor
interference. While most ABM studies assess AB in orienting
(e.g., visual-probe task), some assess threat-distractor interference
(e.g., modiﬁed Stroop task), or use AB measures which may reﬂect
both (e.g., spatial-cueing, visual-search tasks; see Section 4.4.1).
Thus, the question of whether the anxiolytic effect of ABM de-
pends on AB reduction should be clariﬁed to indicate whether it
refers to AB in initial orienting and/or AB in threat-distractor
interference.
In summary, several issues prevent a clear answer to the ques-
tion of whether the anxiolytic effect of ABM training depends on
reduction of AB to threat. Assessments of AB and anxiety are sus-
ceptible to potential confounds (e.g., use of similar AB training and
assessment tasks; response bias in self-report measures; experi-
menter demand effects), some of which may contribute to ﬁndings
of stronger ABM effects in laboratory than home settings, which
highlights the need for rigorous RTCs to evaluate ABM effects (for
further discussion, see Cristea, Kok, et al., 2015; Heeren, Mogoas¸e,
Phillippot, & McNally, 2015). Also, evidence of relationships be-
tween pre-existing AB to threat, AB reduction, and anxiety reduc-
tion is mixed; as some ﬁndings suggest that ABM and control
attention training may reduce anxiety, without reducing AB in
orienting to threat, perhaps by improving cognitive control (e.g.,
Badura-Brack et al. 2015; Heeren, Mogoas¸e, McNally et al., 2015;
Boettcher et al., 2013; McNally et al., 2013). Also, the operationali-
sation of AB to threat would beneﬁt from clariﬁcation (e.g., initial
orienting to threat, maintained attention, threat-distractor inter-
ference). Taken together, these considerations indicate that the
question may be usefully revised as follows: Does the anxiolytic
effect of ABM training relate to its effectiveness in modifying one or
more attention variables, such as reducing AB in orienting towards
threat (initial orienting and/or maintained attention), reducing AB
in threat-distractor interference, reducing AB variability, and/or
improving attention control? To evaluate this question requires
differing experimental tasks to assess and modify AB (to avoid the
methodological problem noted earlier), and inclusion of self-report
and behavioural measures of attention control.5.8. Summary of proposals relevant to ABM research
The proposed framework (summarised in Fig. 4) builds on and
integrates proposals from previous cognitive models of anxiety
(Fig. 2), and models of attention and cognitive control (Fig. 3). Its
components correspond to core cognitive functions identiﬁed by
models of attention, cognitive control and stimulus-salience eval-
uation. The framework has implications for ABM research, because
identiﬁcation of mechanisms and variables that inﬂuence ABs to
threat may not only facilitate evaluation of ABs (which is a key
aspect of ABM research), but also the development of more effec-
tive ABM training methods. Here, we summarise some proposals,
discussed earlier, which have relevance to ABM research:
(i) AB to threat is not a unitary construct: its manifestations
include ABs in orienting towards and away from threat (i.e.,
initial orienting to threat, maintained attention on threat,
threat avoidance) and AB in threat-distractor interference.
(ii) ABs in orienting towards and away from threat depend on
multi-component bottom-up and top-down cognitive sys-
tems (in particular, bottom-up threat-salience evaluation and
top-down goal-directed inhibitory control functions), which
reciprocally inﬂuence each other (Fig. 4). Anxiety and ABs to
threat are consequences of imbalance in these systems. AB in
orienting towards threat is unlikely to be a primary cause of
anxiety.
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difference, task-related and situational variables, such as
symptom comorbidity (anxiety, depression, fear and trauma
symptoms), trait attention control, threat stimulus duration
and intensity, and stressors.
(iv) Anxious individuals do not consistently show AB in orienting
towards threat (e.g., on the visual-probe task), andmay show
threat vigilance, threat avoidance, or unstable AB (rapidly
ﬂuctuating between vigilance and avoidance). Despite vari-
ability in ABs, an overall anxiety-related AB towards threat
may emerge when averaged across studies (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007), which may reﬂect the dominant inﬂuence of the
bottom-up threat-salience-evaluation system over other
processes, including automatic and controlled orienting, in
anxious individuals.
(v) Variation in ABs in orienting towards or away from threat
reﬂects differing motivational/goal-related inﬂuences on
attention from bottom-up and top-down systems. The
bottom-up system supports automatic rapid evaluation and
detection of motivationally salient stimuli (which biases
other bottom-up and top-down processes, including AB in
initial orienting to threat). The cognitive control system ex-
erts goal-directed inﬂuences on orienting, which may
maintain attention on threat (threat monitoring goal), sup-
press AB in orienting to threat or elicit AB away from threat
(e.g., reﬂecting task-focused or distress-reduction goals).
(vi) The anxiolytic effect of ABM training (and other in-
terventions, such as exposure-based treatments) depends on
modifying the balance between top-down and bottom-up
systems. Hence, ABM training may be particularly effective
in reducing anxiety if it strongly engages top-down cognitive
control functions (in particular, goal-directed inhibitory
control, which downregulates the bottom-up threat-
salience-evaluation system, and supports threat-distractor
inhibition and goal-directed processing) during exposure to
multiple, diverse task-irrelevant threat cues. Moreover, as
components of the cognitive control system work in a uni-
tary manner to support goal-directed thought and behaviour
(Duncan, 2010; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al.,
2000), the anxiolytic effect of ABM training may be further
enhanced if ABM training requires coordinated engagement
of multiple top-down functions during exposure to task-
irrelevant threat (i.e., goal-directed inhibitory control; top-
down controlled orienting to goal-relevant information;
cognitive ﬂexibility in switching between adaptive
attention-search goals; maintaining attention-search goals
in working memory by self-verbalisations; and task-related
appraisals of threat cues as goal-irrelevant).
(vii) Training anxious individuals to orient attention away from
threat (as in ABM-threat-avoidance training) may not be an
essential ingredient of effective ABM training. For example,
strengthening threat-distractor inhibition, without involving
spatial orienting, may be beneﬁcial.
(viii) The anxiolytic effect of ABM-positive-search training may
not depend on using highly positive target stimuli, as it also
uses calm nonthreat targets which have relatively mild
positive valence. However, inclusion of highly positive tar-
gets may enhance its efﬁcacy (e.g., by improving positive
mood, engagement with training, and generalisation across
diverse stimuli).
(ix) ABM training which enhances top-down cognitive control,
including threat-distractor inhibition, may reduce anxiety
symptoms of anxious individuals, irrespective of whether
they show pre-existing AB in orienting towards threat, away
from threat, or unstable AB.6. Related issues
The focus of this article on cognitive models of anxiety and AB
and ABM in anxiety prevents detailed consideration of other issues
of potential relevance to the framework described here, such as ABs
in other conditions, and interpretation bias modiﬁcation in anxiety,
which are brieﬂy mentioned in this section.
6.1. ABs in other conditions
Individual differences in ABs are not speciﬁc to threat cues in
anxiety, as they are also found for other motivationally or person-
ally salient information, for example, in illness and pain (Hou et al.,
2014; Todd et al., 2015); as well as for rewards, such as food cues in
obesity (Castellanos et al., 2009) and drug cues in addiction (Field&
Cox, 2008; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). The present framework
has potential relevance for such work, given that exaggerated ABs
may reﬂect imbalance between bottom-up automatic processing of
stimuli which have high motivational salience for the individual
(aversive or reward-related) and top-down cognitive control pro-
cesses, in a variety of health-related and psychological disorders.
6.2. Interpretation bias modiﬁcation in anxiety
Cognitive models of anxiety, reviewed earlier, not only predict
increased attention to threat in anxiety but also a bias in inter-
pretative processes; which is supported by empirical evidence of an
increased tendency for anxious individuals to interpret ambiguous
information in a negative or threat-relatedmanner (see Mathews&
MacLeod, 2005; for a review). Both bottom-up and top-down
processes may contribute to this bias, which has been targeted by
computer-delivered interpretation bias modiﬁcation (IBM) training
(Lau, 2013; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). IBM typically presents
ambiguous stimuli (e.g., scenarios, pictures, homographs) and re-
quires participants to generate a nonthreatening, rather than
threat-related interpretation (e.g., generate a word relevant to the
nonthreatening meaning of the ambiguous information). Meta-
analytic ﬁndings suggest that IBM training has a small effect on
reducing negative mood (Cristea, Kok et al., 2015; Hallion & Ruscio,
2011; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014). As IBM may encourage a
response strategy to select less negative answers on self-report
measures of anxiety, it would be useful to include physiological
outcome measures; for example, by examining associations be-
tween self-reported anxiety reduction and changes in amygdala-
frontocortical connectivity implicated in threat evaluation (Pessoa
& Adolphs, 2010; Buhle et al., 2014), or threat-related startle re-
sponses (Grillon, 2008).
7. Concluding comments
In summary, the present framework encompasses the hypoth-
esis that anxiety stems from imbalance between bottom-up
mechanisms involved in automatic threat evaluation/detection
(including automatic stimulus-salience evaluation, orienting,
interrupt, alerting and perceptual processing) and a top-down
cognitive control system which coordinates multiple functions to
support goal-directed thought, action and emotion regulation
(including inhibitory control, strategic orienting, attention ﬂexi-
bility, working memory functions, and reason-based appraisal).
Bottom-up stimulus-salience-evaluation processes play a key role
not only in assessing the motivational importance and threat value
of stimuli by integratingmultiple sources of information, but also in
modulating activity in other bottom-up and top-down processes to
prioritise motivationally salient information (Pessoa & Adolphs,
2010). Top-down inhibitory control underpins a wide range of
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key role in suppressing activity and inﬂuence of the bottom-up
stimulus-salience evaluation mechanism, to support and priori-
tise goal-directed processes and behaviour. Consequently, it may be
particularly useful for ABM to target and strengthen goal-directed
inhibitory control over processing of task-irrelevant threat cues.
ABs towards and away from threat on attentional tasks may
reﬂect themotivational priorities of the individual in that particular
situation (e.g., to detect, monitor or avoid threat; or focus on task-
related goals), which in turn may depend on state and trait in-
ﬂuences (e.g., bottom-up bias from threat-salience evaluation sys-
tem, top-down attention control, anxiety level, symptom proﬁle,
distress tolerance) and task-related and situational factors (e.g.,
task demands, threat severity, external stressors). Thus, ABs in
orienting to threat may reﬂect imbalance between bottom-up and
top-down systems involved in threat processing, without neces-
sarily playing a primary casual role in anxiety.
A potential limitation of the framework is that it may seem
relatively unconstrained, as it identiﬁes multiple interlinked
bottom-up and top-down cognitive functions in threat processing.
This conceptualisation echoes the emphasis in cognitive-
neuroscience research on interconnectivity and mutual inﬂuences
amongmultiple brain networks. Its resulting ﬂexibility maymake it
more difﬁcult to evaluate, compared with cognitive models which
propose that anxiety is primarily caused by a single cognitive bias
(e.g., an automatic AB towards threat, reﬂected by spatial orient-
ing). However, the latter view may be inaccurate and the present
frameworkmay be useful in providing a context for developing and
evaluating interventions, by focusing more on modifying in-
teractions between bottom-up and top-down systems. Further
research is required to clarify the relationships between the
component functions in the framework, given that understanding
of precise nature of these inter-relationships is incomplete.
To advance progress, studies which evaluate treatments for
anxiety should indicate the theoretical rationale underlying the
intervention. Thus, studies assessing the effect of ABM-threat-
avoidance training on anxiety should explain why this is expected
to have long-term therapeutic beneﬁt, given that this is disputed.
For example, threat-avoidance is not consistently associated with
low trait anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and is sometimes found in
anxiety disorders (e.g., Eldar et al., 2012; Salum et al., 2013; Waters
et al., 2014).
Distinctions between bottom-up and top-down spatial orient-
ing and inhibitory control processes have implications for ABM.
Interventions such as ABM-threat-avoidance training, which focus
on modifying automatic orienting towards threat without actively
promoting engagement of cognitive control processes, may have
relatively weak or inconsistent effects on improving goal-directed
inhibitory control over threat processing. Instead, interventions
that actively engage an integrated cognitive control system, which
coordinates multiple top-down functions, may be more effective in
normalising imbalance in top-down and bottom-up systems
involved in threat processing, than those which target a single
cognitive bias. For example, enhanced ABM-positive-search
training aims to encourage active, ﬂexible and sustained goal-
directed attention search for positive and nonthreat information,
while strengthening top-down inhibitory control over processing
of threat distractors. While it explicitly trains attention search for
positive versus negative stimuli (hence, is considered a variant of
ABM training), it is not process-pure. For example, it engages
multiple top-down functions during repeated exposure to threat
cues, and may have benign widespread effects on processing by
reducing the dominating inﬂuence of automatic threat-salience
evaluation processes on other bottom-up and top-down cognitive
functions. Nevertheless, a theory-driven multi-function treatmentapproach, guided by models of anxiety, attention and cognitive
control, may provide a useful step towards developing more
effective treatments which can be delivered easily and inexpen-
sively to large numbers of anxious individuals.
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